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ARTICLE IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ARTICLE IX

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A Comprehensive Learning Material and Summary

Incorporating Commentaries from:
Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. and Justice Isagani A. Cruz

With Leading Jurisprudence

1987 Philippine Constitution

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INTRODUCTION

Article IX of the 1987 Philippine Constitution establishes three independent Constitutional Commissions that serve as vital pillars of good governance, accountability, and democratic integrity. These commissions—the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission on Audit (COA)—perform critical functions in personnel management, electoral administration, and fiscal oversight.

Bernas Commentary: These commissions perform key functions in government. To protect their integrity, they have been made constitutional bodies. The CSC, COMELEC, and COA were constitutionalized to ensure their independence from political pressures and executive interference.

PART A: COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 1: Constitutional Commissions Established

Constitutional Text: "The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit."

Key Elements:

Bernas Commentary: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections perform key functions in the government. The first is the personnel office of government, the second the auditing office, and the third is charged with the administration of the all-important electoral process. In order to protect their integrity, they have been made independent constitutional bodies.

Historical Context:

Bernas notes that the Commission on Civil Service was first made a constitutional body by the 1973 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, both the Commission on Elections and the Auditing Office were constitutional bodies; but the Auditing Office was a one-man office. The 1973 Constitution expanded the membership of these bodies. The 1987 provision is based on the 1973 version.

Leading Case: Gonzales III v. Office of the President (2014)

Section 2: Prohibitions and Qualifications

Constitutional Text: "No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."

Purpose of Prohibitions:

Bernas: Section 2 imposes on these Commissions a list of prohibitions against engaging in activities which can distract them from their responsibilities or subject them to pressures and temptations. These protective measures are found in various provisions designed to shield them from outside influences and political pressures.

The Three Core Prohibitions:

  1. Holding Other Office or Employment

    • Members cannot hold any other office or employment during their tenure (except as otherwise provided in the Constitution).

  2. Practice of Profession or Business Management

    • Members cannot engage in the practice of any profession or active management/control of any business that may be affected by their functions.

  3. Financial Interest in Government Contracts

    • Members cannot be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any government contract, franchise, or privilege.

LANDMARK CASE: Funa v. Duque (G.R. No. 191672, Nov. 25, 2014)

Facts:

On January 11, 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III as CSC Chairman. Shortly after, Executive Order No. 864 was issued, designating Duque to sit as ex officio board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF. Petitioner Dennis Funa challenged this designation, arguing that it violated the CSC's independence and the constitutional prohibition against holding multiple offices.

Issue:

Whether Executive Order No. 864 violated the CSC's independence under Article IX-A, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution by designating its Chairman as ex officio member of various GOCC boards.

Held:

The Supreme Court (through Justice Lucas P. Bersamin) struck down EO 864 as unconstitutional. The CSC must remain independent and insulated from executive control. The designation violated Article IX-A, Section 2, which strictly prohibits members from holding any other office, even in an ex officio capacity, unless expressly allowed by the Constitution.

Doctrine:

The prohibition against multiple offices applies strictly—even ex officio positions without additional compensation undermine constitutional autonomy if not explicitly authorized by the Constitution. This ensures that Constitutional Commissions remain free from potential executive influence or conflicts of interest.

Bernas Commentary: While the President has control over executive officers, the legislature controls their "person" through the Civil Service system. The designation of the CSC Chairman to GOCC boards creates a situation where the Commission could become beholden to the executive branch, compromising its independence in personnel matters.

Section 3: Salary Protection

Constitutional Text: "The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure."

Bernas: This provision protects the independence of Commission members by ensuring their compensation cannot be reduced as a form of pressure or retaliation during their term of office.

Cruz: The non-diminution of salary clause is a critical safeguard against legislative or executive attempts to influence Commission decisions through economic coercion.

Section 4: Appointments

Constitutional Text: "The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law."

Key Requirements for Commission Members:

Bernas: Constitutional Commissions are offices specifically authorized by the Constitution to appoint their officials. However, this does not mean appointments are not subject to Civil Service Law and Rules. Had the framers intended to isolate these bodies from CSC oversight in appointments, the Constitution would have so provided. All matters pertaining to appointments remain within the CSC's realm of expertise.

LANDMARK CASE: Funa v. Villar (G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)

Facts:

Reynaldo A. Villar was appointed COA Commissioner in 2004 for a term ending February 2, 2011. When Chairman Guillermo Carague retired in 2008, Villar was designated Acting Chairman and later formally appointed as Chairman on April 18, 2008. His appointment papers indicated he would serve only until February 2, 2011. However, Villar later claimed entitlement to a fresh seven-year term as Chairman, ending in 2015.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of Reynaldo Villar as COA Chairman, after serving four years as Commissioner, violated the constitutional prohibition against reappointment under Article IX-D, Section 1(2).

Held:

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., writing for the Court, ruled that Villar's appointment was valid only until the expiration of his original term as Commissioner. A promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman is not prohibited, provided the total tenure does not exceed seven years.

Doctrine:

Promotional appointments within Constitutional Commissions are allowed, but must conform to the seven-year aggregate limit and rotational safeguards under Article IX-D. The prohibition on reappointment preserves independence and prevents executive manipulation of Commission composition. The decision emphasized the importance of the rotational plan to safeguard the independence of Constitutional Commissions.

Bernas: The staggered rotational system ensures continuity by not allowing the term of all Commissioners to expire at one time. Every two years, the term of one Commissioner expires, leaving always two veteran Commissioners behind. The prohibition against reappointment, even for promotional appointments, prevents any circumvention of this carefully designed system.

Section 5: Fiscal Autonomy

Constitutional Text: "The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released."

What Fiscal Autonomy Means:

LANDMARK CASE: CSC v. Department of Budget and Management (G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)

Facts:

In fiscal year 2002, the General Appropriations Act allocated ₱215,270,000.00 for the CSC Central Office. However, the DBM released only ₱279,853,398.14 out of the total ₱285,660,790.44 from all sources, leaving ₱5,807,392.30 unreleased. The DBM justified the withholding based on its "no report, no release" policy requiring submission of various financial and operational reports before releasing funds. The CSC filed a petition for mandamus, asserting that the policy infringed on its constitutional right to fiscal autonomy.

Issue:

Whether the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) could withhold portions of the Civil Service Commission's budget under its "no report, no release" policy, and whether such withholding violated the CSC's constitutional guarantee of fiscal autonomy.

Held:

Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, writing for the Court, granted the petition and declared the DBM's withholding of funds unconstitutional. The "no report, no release" policy cannot be imposed on agencies with fiscal autonomy, such as the CSC, COA, COMELEC, and the Judiciary. "Automatic release" means unconditional and perfunctory disbursement of approved appropriations.

Doctrine:

Constitutional Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy, and any policy or practice that imposes conditions on the release of their funds violates the Constitution. The Court emphasized that fiscal autonomy mandates priority in fund releases for constitutionally protected entities. The DBM was ordered to release the withheld ₱5,807,392.30 to the CSC.

Bernas: The word 'automatic' was deliberately chosen to ensure that no condition to fund releases may be imposed. Being 'automatic,' it means that no condition may be attached to the fund releases. The fund releases must be unconditional and perfunctory.

Section 6: Promulgation of Rules

Constitutional Text: "Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Rule-Making Authority:

Bernas: The Constitutional Commissions are independent bodies. Hence, the power of the Supreme Court over rules issued by quasi-judicial bodies found in Article VIII, Section 5(5) does not apply to them. The Court, however, in appropriate cases, may exercise "judicial review" over them.

Cruz: Congress may not assume power to review rules promulgated by the Commissions, as this would infringe upon their constitutional independence.

Section 7: Decisions and Judicial Review

Constitutional Text: "Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Key Requirements:

Bernas: The power conferred on the Supreme Court is limited to review of final decisions en banc, and does not extend to interlocutory orders issued by a Division. Only grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be reviewed. The Constitution limits review to cases involving the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Section 8: Additional Functions

Constitutional Text: "Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law."

This provision allows Congress to expand (but not diminish) the powers of the Constitutional Commissions through legislation, provided such laws do not impair their independence or core constitutional functions.

PART B: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 1: Organization and Scope

Composition:

Qualifications:

Bernas: The requirement that they must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment effectively excludes political lame-ducks and repeats the general rule found in Section 6.

Scope of Civil Service:

Constitutional Text: "The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."

Bernas: The first in the list are 'all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,' none of which can escape the reach of the Civil Service Law. The Civil Service system mandated under the Constitution embraces all branches and subdivisions of the Government.

Section 2: Merit System and Appointments

Constitutional Text: "Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination."

Classification of Positions:

  1. Competitive Positions (General Rule)

    • Appointments determined by competitive examination

  2. Non-Competitive Positions (Exceptions)

    • Policy-determining
    • Primarily confidential
    • Highly technical

Bernas: The primary purpose of the classification into policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical positions is 'to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness.' Appointment to a competitive position must be made according to merit and fitness as determined, as far as practicable, by competitive examinations. Appointments to non-competitive positions are also appointed according to merit and fitness; but in their regard merit and fitness are not determined by competitive examinations but by other modes which may be prescribed by law.

Cruz: Whether a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical is ultimately a judicial question. The classification made by the executive, while to be accorded the weight it deserves, is not definitively determinative of the nature of the position.

Definitions:

Role of CSC in Appointments:

Bernas: The role of the Civil Service Commission in the appointing process is limited to the determination of the qualifications of the candidates for appointment. It plays no role in the choice of the person to be appointed. Thus, when more than one person is qualified for a position and the appointing authority chooses the one who is less qualified, the Civil Service Commission may not revoke such appointment in order to place one who is better qualified. The Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority.

Section 3: Security of Tenure

Constitutional Text: "No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."

Meaning of Security of Tenure:

Bernas: The efficiency of a civil service system depends largely on the morale of the officers and employees in the service. Morale, in turn, can be fatally undermined when the security of officers in the possession of their office is unprotected against the arbitrary action of superior officers. Hence, basic in any civil service is a guarantee of security of tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment, whether total or partial, of the right to continue in the position held.

Two Aspects of Protection:

  1. Substantive Due Process

    • Removal only for valid cause provided by law

  2. Procedural Due Process

    • Removal must follow procedure prescribed by law

Bernas: Early jurisprudence tended to indicate that the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure did not extend to positions which were policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical. Subsequent decisions, however, corrected this impression. The constitutional enumeration of such positions merely exempted them from the requirement of appointments through competitive examinations but not from the operation of the principle that 'no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause provided by law.'

Important Distinctions:

Bernas: Security of tenure is enjoyed only by permanent appointees. Temporary appointees are removable any time even without cause. However, one does not become a permanent appointee unless qualified for the position, and this, even if the appointment extended is mistakenly designated as permanent. The appointment of one who is not qualified can only be temporary and it is understood from the outset that it is without fixity but enduring only at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Protection Against Circumvention:

Bernas: The requirement of security of tenure cannot be circumvented by resort to abolition of office. While abolition of office does not imply removal of the incumbent officer, this is true only where the abolition of office is done in good faith and not merely as a cover for a removal otherwise not allowed by the Constitution. Thus, for abolition of office to escape the taint of unconstitutionality, it must be made (1) in good faith, (2) not for personal or political reasons, and (3) not in violation of the law.

LANDMARK CASE: CSC v. Fuentes (G.R. No. 237322, Jan. 10, 2023)

Facts:

On September 29, 2004, PO1 Gilbert Fuentes was involved in a fatal shooting incident in Caloocan City following a traffic altercation. The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) found him guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed him from service. The CSC affirmed this ruling, citing substantial evidence including eyewitness accounts, ballistics results, and paraffin tests. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the CSC's decision, ruling that the shooting was accidental and dismissing the administrative complaint.

Issue:

Whether the Civil Service Commission had legal standing to appeal the Court of Appeals' reversal of its decision dismissing PO1 Fuentes for grave misconduct, and whether such reversal impaired the CSC's constitutional mandate.

Held:

Justice Lopez, writing for the Court, granted the petition and reinstated the CSC's dismissal order. The Court held that the CSC has standing to appeal decisions that adversely affect its constitutional functions. The CSC's disciplinary authority is integral to its role under Article IX-B, Section 3, and its quasi-judicial nature does not preclude it from defending its rulings when the civil service system is prejudiced.

Doctrine:

The CSC's mandate includes enforcing discipline and promoting integrity in the civil service. Its decisions may be appealed when necessary to preserve public accountability. The ruling affirmed the CSC's constitutional authority to discipline civil servants and its legal standing to appeal decisions that compromise its mandate.

Bernas: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has a constitutional duty to maintain the integrity and accountability of the civil service. This includes the power to investigate and discipline erring officials and employees. The Court's recognition of CSC's standing to appeal ensures that its disciplinary authority is not undermined by appellate reversals that prejudice the civil service system.

Section 4-8: Additional CSC Provisions

Section 4: Oath of Office

All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution.

Section 5: Standardization of Compensation

Congress shall provide for standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including GOCCs with original charters, considering the nature of responsibilities and qualifications required.

Section 6: Political Lame Ducks

No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any GOCC or their subsidiaries.

Bernas: This provision aims to prevent the appointment of political lame ducks to government positions, which could compromise merit-based selection.

Section 7: Prohibition on Multiple Offices

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless allowed by law or primary functions, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.

Section 8: Additional Compensation and Foreign Titles

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without Congress's consent, any present, emolument, office, or title from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities are not considered additional compensation.

PART C: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1: Organization

Composition:

Qualifications:

Bernas: Like the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections is an administrative agency. As such, it can only perform powers proper to an administrative agency: executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.

Section 2: Powers and Functions

The COMELEC exercises control and supervision over all elections, ensuring they are free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible. Its extensive powers include:

  1. Enforce and administer all election laws
  2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests
  3. Decide all questions affecting elections
  4. Deputize law enforcement agencies for election purposes
  5. Register political parties and accredit citizens' arms
  6. File petitions for inclusion/exclusion of voters; investigate and prosecute election law violations
  7. Recommend measures to minimize election spending and prevent fraud
  8. Recommend removal of deputized officers for violations
  9. Submit comprehensive reports to President and Congress on each election

Bernas: By exception, judicial power is given to the Commission only in a limited way relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective local officials. The Commission on Elections is not a court but an administrative agency. Hence, it cannot claim so-called inherent powers of courts.

LANDMARK CASE: Bedol v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179830, Dec. 3, 2009)

Facts:

Following the May 14, 2007 elections, Atty. Lintang Bedol, Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, failed to attend multiple scheduled canvassing sessions and investigative hearings regarding alleged electoral fraud. He later claimed that election documents in his custody were stolen but failed to report the loss promptly. COMELEC created Task Force Maguindanao to investigate, but Bedol continued to ignore subpoenas and made public statements challenging COMELEC's authority.

Issue:

Whether the Commission on Elections validly exercised its contempt powers against Bedol for repeated noncompliance with subpoenas and public defiance, and whether such exercise was within its constitutional mandate under Article IX-C.

Held:

Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, writing for the Court, dismissed the petition and upheld COMELEC's authority. The Court ruled that COMELEC's investigative functions, especially in probing election fraud, are quasi-judicial in nature and include the power to compel attendance and punish contempt. The Court cited Section 52(e) of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 29 of COMELEC's Rules of Procedure, which allow indirect contempt proceedings even without a private complaint.

Doctrine:

COMELEC's constitutional mandate includes ensuring honest and credible elections, and its powers must be construed broadly to fulfill this duty. The contempt power is essential to enforce compliance and maintain institutional respect. The ruling reinforced COMELEC's quasi-judicial authority under Article IX-C and its power to act motu proprio in safeguarding electoral integrity.

Bernas: The power to cite for contempt is necessary for the COMELEC to effectively discharge its constitutional duties. Without this power, the Commission would be unable to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents essential to its investigative and adjudicatory functions.

PART D: THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 1: Organization

Composition:

Qualifications:

Section 2: Powers and Functions

Audit Jurisdiction:

COA has the power to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to:

Exclusive Authority:

Subject to constitutional limitations, COA has exclusive authority to:

Bernas: The constitutional competence of COA relates solely to the administrative aspect of expenditure of public funds, not the criminal aspect. Thus, COA's approval of vouchers does not preclude criminal investigation by prosecutors.

LANDMARK CASE: DBP v. COA (G.R. No. 88435, Jan. 16, 2002)

Facts:

In 1986, the Philippine government secured a US$310 million Economic Recovery Loan from the World Bank, which required DBP to undergo private external audits in addition to COA audits. Pursuant to this, DBP engaged Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as its private auditor. Initially, COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona Jr. did not object, but his successor, Chairman Eufemio Domingo, reversed this stance, disallowing payments to the private auditor and asserting COA's exclusive audit authority. COA issued two letter-decisions holding DBP officials personally liable for the audit fees paid.

Issue:

Whether the Commission on Audit has the exclusive constitutional authority to audit government-owned or controlled corporations, thereby prohibiting DBP from engaging private external auditors in compliance with World Bank loan conditions.

Held:

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, writing for the Court, ruled that COA's audit power under Section 2(1) is not exclusive, as the Constitution deliberately omitted the word "exclusive" from that provision. The Court cited the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, which rejected proposals to make COA's audit power exclusive, allowing flexibility for concurrent private audits in cases involving privatization, foreign loans, or investor requirements.

Important Distinction:

However, COA retains exclusive authority under Section 2(2) to define audit scope and disallow expenditures. Thus, while DBP may engage private auditors, COA's findings prevail and its disallowance of audit fees stands. DBP officials were held personally liable.

Doctrine:

"While DBP may engage private auditors, COA's findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned." The ruling clarified that while concurrent audits are constitutionally permissible, COA's regulatory and disallowance powers remain supreme under Article IX-D, Section 2(2).

Bernas: The framers deliberately chose not to make COA's audit power exclusive to allow flexibility in special circumstances such as international loan requirements. However, this does not diminish COA's supreme authority to define audit scope and disallow irregular expenditures.

Section 3: Protection Against Exemption

Constitutional Text: "No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."

Bernas: This provision ensures comprehensive oversight of all public funds. Even entities with special charters or unique structures cannot escape COA's constitutional audit authority. No entity can claim exemption from COA jurisdiction, regardless of how it may be structured or characterized.

Section 4: Reporting Requirements

The Commission shall submit to the President and Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering:

CONCLUSION

The Constitutional Commissions: Guardians of Democratic Governance

The Constitutional Commissions represent the framers' commitment to institutionalizing checks and balances beyond the traditional three branches of government. Their independence, secured through fiscal autonomy, security of tenure, and protection from executive interference, ensures they can perform their vital functions without fear or favor.

Key Principles from Jurisprudence: As Justice Leonen observed in Gonzales III, these commissions "must be insulated from executive control to preserve their integrity and impartiality." This principle animates the entire architecture of Article IX—from the prohibition on multiple offices to the guarantee of automatic budget releases—creating institutions capable of serving as effective guardians of good governance, electoral integrity, and fiscal responsibility.

The Three Pillars of Accountability:

  1. Civil Service Commission

    • Ensures merit-based appointments, protects security of tenure, and maintains professionalism in the bureaucracy. Through its disciplinary authority and oversight of the civil service system, the CSC serves as the guardian of public service integrity.

  2. Commission on Elections

    • Safeguards the electoral process, ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Through its administrative, quasi-judicial, and enforcement powers, COMELEC protects the fundamental right of suffrage and democratic governance.

  3. Commission on Audit

    • Exercises comprehensive oversight of government finances, preventing irregular expenditures and ensuring accountability in the use of public funds. Through its audit power and authority to disallow expenditures, COA serves as the fiscal conscience of government.

Final Reflection from Bernas: "These commissions perform key functions in government. To protect their integrity, they have been made constitutional bodies." The constitutionalization of these commissions reflects the framers' wisdom in recognizing that good governance requires independent institutions that can check the exercise of power and ensure accountability. Their constitutional status places them beyond the reach of legislative abolition or executive control, ensuring they remain as permanent fixtures in our democratic framework.

Cruz: "The independence of these Constitutional Commissions is not merely a matter of form but of substance. It is designed to ensure that they can discharge their functions without fear or favor, immune from political pressures and executive interference. This independence is the cornerstone of their effectiveness and the foundation of public trust in their integrity."

STUDY GUIDE AND KEY TAKEAWAYS

Essential Concepts to Master:

  1. Independence of Constitutional Commissions

    • Understand the multi-faceted nature of independence: fiscal autonomy, security of tenure, prohibition on multiple offices, and freedom from executive control.

  2. Merit System vs. Non-Competitive Positions

    • Master the distinction between competitive positions (merit-based through exams) and non-competitive positions (policy-determining, primarily confidential, highly technical), and understand that both still enjoy security of tenure.

  3. Security of Tenure

    • Know the dual protection: substantive (removal only for cause) and procedural (due process required). Understand exceptions and limitations.

  4. Fiscal Autonomy

    • Memorize that "automatic release" means unconditional—no reports or conditions may be imposed on Constitutional Commissions.

  5. Scope of COA Audit Power

    • Understand the distinction: Section 2(1) audit power is NOT exclusive (allows private audits), but Section 2(2) regulatory power IS exclusive (COA findings prevail).

Case Law Integration:

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