ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

02 Nov, 2025

ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1987 Philippine Constitution

Learning Material and Summary

With Commentary from:

• Bernas (Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.)
• Cruz (Justice Isagani A. Cruz)

Incorporating Jurisprudence from 11 Landmark Cases

INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution establishes the Judicial Department as an independent and co-equal branch of government. This article represents a significant enhancement of judicial independence compared to previous constitutions, particularly through innovations in fiscal autonomy, the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, and the expanded definition of judicial power.

Bernas Commentary:

The 1987 Constitution's treatment of the judiciary reflects the framers' determination to ensure genuine independence after the experience of authoritarian rule. The provisions on fiscal autonomy, the prohibition against salary diminution, and the creation of the JBC all serve to insulate the judiciary from political pressure. The second paragraph of Section 1, which imposes on the Court the duty to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion, was specifically crafted to eliminate the prudential type of political questions that allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on institutional difficulties.

Cruz Commentary:

The judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice. The Constitution has given this power exclusively to the judiciary, and no other branch may exercise it. However, the exercise of this power is subject to intrinsic limitations—courts can only act when there is an actual case or controversy, and they must respect the political question doctrine in matters constitutionally committed to other branches.

SECTION 1: JUDICIAL POWER AND ITS SCOPE

Constitutional Text

"The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Definition of Judicial Power

Judicial power encompasses two fundamental aspects:

1. Traditional Judicial Function: The right to determine actual controversies between adverse litigants duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction
2. Expanded Power of Judicial Review: The duty to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of government

Bernas Commentary:

Judicial power has been defined in jurisprudence as "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." It is "the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights."

The exercise of judicial power goes beyond the mere promulgation of final decisions. In Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice, where the sentence of death had become final and executory, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order delaying execution. Against the contention that the Court had violated the rule on finality of judgment and even encroached on the President's power of executive clemency, the Court replied that the power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.

Cruz Commentary:

Courts are given "judicial power," nothing more. Judicial power, therefore, is the measure of the allowable scope of judicial action. A proper understanding of this concept is essential to understanding the role of the judiciary in the constitutional scheme.

The Revolutionary Change: Grave Abuse of Discretion Standard

The second paragraph of Section 1 represents a revolutionary expansion of judicial power:

Bernas Commentary:

The frequency with which the Court appealed to the political questions doctrine during the Marcos years motivated Commissioner Roberto Concepcion to work for the insertion of the second paragraph. For all practical purposes, this has eliminated the prudential type of political questions from Philippine jurisprudence. The Court said as much in Marcos v. Manglapus: "The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power... We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the political question doctrine."

Requisites for Exercise of Judicial Power

For courts to exercise judicial power, the following requisites must be met:

1. Actual Case or Controversy - There must be a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution
2. Legal Standing (Locus Standi) - The party must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
3. Ripeness - The question must be ripe for adjudication
4. Mootness - The case must not have become moot and academic
5. Political Question Exception - The issue must not be a political question constitutionally committed to another branch

Bernas Commentary:

The Constitution does not define when a question is "political." Baker v. Carr has attempted to formulate guidelines: a political question is found when there is (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards; (3) impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination; (4) impossibility of undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches; (5) unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision; or (6) potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements.

However, because of the duty to determine grave abuse of discretion, the question is not political even when there is "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision" or "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements." This partial definition of judicial power has the purpose of emphasizing that when "grave abuse of discretion" is committed even by the highest executive authority, the judiciary should not hide behind the political questions doctrine.

CASE STUDY: Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)

Facts: Ferdinand Marcos, deposed in 1986 and exiled in Hawaii, sought to return to the Philippines to die. President Aquino barred his return, citing threats to national security from multiple destabilization attempts by Marcos loyalists, ongoing insurgencies, and economic fragility. Marcos filed for mandamus and prohibition, claiming violation of his constitutional right to return to his country.

Issue: Whether the President possesses constitutional power to prohibit Marcos's return absent specific statutory authorization, or whether this exceeds executive authority and violates constitutional guarantees of liberty and travel.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the President's power, establishing landmark doctrines:

Key Doctrines Established:

1. Residual Presidential Powers - Executive power is more than the sum of enumerated powers; Article VII, Section 1's broad grant of "executive power" includes inherent authority to protect national interest

2. Grave Abuse of Discretion Test - While Article VIII, Section 1 expanded judicial review, not all political questions are eliminated. The Court inquires only whether factual bases exist for the President's decision, not whether the decision is correct

3. Pre-emptive Presidential Action - The State may take pre-emptive action against nascent threats to national existence without waiting for actual violence

Bernas Commentary in Marcos:

This case demonstrates that the expanded judicial power under Section 1 does not eliminate all executive discretion. Certain matters remain exclusively presidential (e.g., recognition of foreign governments, grant of pardons). The Court's inquiry is limited to whether factual bases existed for the President's conclusion—if such bases exist, there is no arbitrary action or grave abuse of discretion.

Court's Analysis:

The Court found sufficient factual basis:

• Documented destabilization efforts (Manila Hotel coup, Channel 7 takeover, Black Forest Commando raid)
• Continuing threats: communist insurgency, Mindanao separatism, rightist conspiracies
• "Catalytic effect" of Marcos's return potentially uniting disparate anti-government forces
• Precarious economic state from Marcos-era plunder
• Presidential determination that destabilization would "wipe away gains achieved"

Significance for Article VIII:

This case illustrates how the "grave abuse of discretion" standard in Section 1 actually operates—courts review for arbitrariness, not wisdom. The President's exercise of residual powers is justiciable, but judicial review is limited to determining whether decisions have factual foundation.

CASE STUDY: Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo (2012)

Facts: Francis Saez filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, claiming military surveillance, inclusion in an "order of battle" linking him to the Communist Party, and coercion to become a military asset. He named President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as respondent. The Court of Appeals dropped the President based on presidential immunity.

Issue: Whether the President may be automatically dropped as respondent in amparo/habeas data proceedings solely on the basis of presidential immunity, or whether command responsibility doctrine allows presidential accountability.

Ruling: No automatic dismissal. While the petition ultimately failed for lack of evidence, the Court held:

Key Doctrines:

1. Presidential Immunity is Temporal - Immunity exists only during incumbency; non-sitting presidents cannot invoke it even for acts during tenure

2. Command Responsibility Applied to President - As Commander-in-Chief, the President can be held liable for violations of rights to life, liberty, and security if substantial evidence shows:

   • Presidential involvement or imputed knowledge of violations, OR
   • Failure to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting investigations

3. Courts Disfavor Immunity When It Impedes Truth - Presidential immunity cannot be invoked to obstruct the search for truth or vindication of rights, especially in human rights cases

Bernas Commentary on Executive Accountability:

While the President as Commander-in-Chief has broad discretion in military matters, this does not place presidential actions beyond judicial scrutiny when constitutional rights are violated. The command responsibility doctrine ensures that the highest executive authority cannot claim immunity from accountability when subordinates commit violations under his or her watch.

Evidentiary Burden:

The Court emphasized that petitioners must prove allegations against the President by substantial evidence:

• Superior-subordinate relationship
• Knowledge or reason to know crimes were about to be or had been committed
• Failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish

In this case, Saez merely included the President's name without showing actual involvement, knowledge, or any prior request for investigation brought to the President's attention.

Significance for Article VIII:

This case demonstrates the practical application of Section 1's "grave abuse of discretion" standard to the highest executive officer. While presidential immunity exists, it does not create an absolute shield against judicial inquiry into constitutional violations—the expanded judicial power under Article VIII allows courts to determine whether the President failed to exercise constitutional duties, but requires substantial proof.

CASE STUDY: Ople v. Torres (1998)

Facts: President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 establishing a National Computerized Identification Reference System (National ID System) requiring all citizens and foreign residents to register and obtain ID cards containing extensive personal information, including fingerprints. Senator Blas Ople challenged the order as unconstitutional, arguing it violated the right to privacy and exceeded executive authority.

Issue: Whether the President, absent legislative authority, may establish a comprehensive national ID system through executive order, and whether such system violates constitutional rights to privacy.

Ruling: The Supreme Court struck down the Administrative Order as unconstitutional.

Key Doctrines:

1. Limits on Executive Legislative Power - While the President has broad executive powers, establishing a comprehensive system requiring all citizens to register and provide information requires legislative authority under the principle of separation of powers

2. Constitutional Right to Privacy - The Constitution recognizes a right to privacy implicit in Article III (Bill of Rights) and Article II (Declaration of Principles). Administrative Order 308 was an "unbridled incursion" into this right

3. Judicial Review of Executive Orders - Courts will scrutinize executive orders that affect fundamental rights and lack clear statutory authorization

Bernas Commentary on Privacy:

The right to privacy is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, but it is recognized as a fundamental right emanating from the guarantee of liberty and other provisions. The State's interest in establishing an identification system must be balanced against individual privacy rights, and any such system requires legislative enactment with appropriate safeguards.

Court's Analysis:

The Court found that AO 308:

• Lacked statutory basis for such comprehensive data collection
• Required sensitive personal information without adequate safeguards
• Created infrastructure for potential abuse and surveillance
• Should have been established through legislation with proper checks and balances

Significance for Article VIII:

This case exemplifies judicial power under Section 1 to check executive action that affects constitutional rights. Even absent a specific statutory violation, the Court invoked its duty to determine "grave abuse of discretion" when the executive exceeds constitutional bounds. The decision reinforces that expanded judicial review includes protecting fundamental rights from executive overreach.

CASE STUDY: In re Bermudez (1986)

Facts: Saturnino Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking interpretation of Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, questioning whether "incumbent President and Vice President" referred to Aquino-Laurel or Marcos-Tolentino. The petition was filed during the revolutionary government period, before the Constitution's ratification.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief, whether an incumbent President can be sued, and whether questions of government legitimacy are justiciable.

Ruling: Petition dismissed for multiple grounds:

Key Doctrines:

1. No Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Relief - "It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief"—the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over such petitions

2. Presidential Immunity from Suit During Incumbency - "Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure"

3. Government Legitimacy is a Political Question - "The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge"

4. De Jure Government Status - A government "in effective control of the entire country" and recognized by "the community of nations" is "not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government"

Bernas Commentary on Political Questions:

Questions concerning who legitimately holds governmental power are quintessentially political. They are resolved by the people through acceptance and by international recognition, not by judicial decree. The judiciary cannot make governments—it can only recognize them once the political process has spoken.

Significance for Article VIII:

This case, decided in the transition period leading to the 1987 Constitution, established foundational principles about the limits of judicial power. Even with the expanded judicial review in Section 1, certain questions remain beyond judicial competence:

• Who legitimately holds power (resolved by the people)
• Whether a government is de facto or de jure (resolved by effective control and recognition)
• Abstract constitutional interpretations absent actual controversies

The case illustrates that while Section 1 eliminated "prudential" political questions (where courts refuse review from institutional caution), it preserved "classical" political questions (where the Constitution commits decisions to another branch or to the people themselves).

SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Constitutional Text

"The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members."

Congressional Power Over Court Organization

Bernas Commentary:

Article VIII, Section 1 vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. This vesting formula implies that the Supreme Court is the creation of the Constitution itself, while inferior courts are the creation of Congress. From this flows the principle that Congress has power to create inferior courts, apportion their jurisdiction, and even abolish them—but Congress has no power to abolish the Supreme Court.

The authority to create courts includes the authority to abolish courts. However, abolition must not be used as a subterfuge for removing unwanted judges. Hence the Constitution adds: "No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members."

Cruz Commentary:

While Congress may abolish courts of inferior jurisdiction, such abolition must be done in good faith and not for political or personal reasons. When abolition is in good faith, there is no "removal" from office because removal implies the office exists after the ouster. Abolition of office, when the office itself ceases to exist, is not removal.

Apportionment of Jurisdiction

Bernas Commentary:

Congress has broad power to apportion jurisdiction among courts, but this power is subject to two critical limitations:

1. Constitutional Minimum Jurisdiction - Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
2. Prohibition Against Encroachment - Congress may not vest judicial power in non-judicial bodies

In Cortes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court struck down a law attempting to vest the Insurance Commissioner with exclusive original jurisdiction over claims arising from insurance contracts. The Court held that while the Insurance Commissioner has regulatory powers, judicial power to adjudicate insurance disputes belongs to courts.

📘 CASE STUDY: De la Llana v. Alba (1984)

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980) mandated that justices and judges of inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts (except the Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals), would be considered separated from the judiciary upon completion of reorganization unless appointed to courts established by the act. Several judges challenged this as violating security of tenure.

Issue: Whether the Judicial Reorganization Act, which abolished existing courts and required judges to apply for positions in newly created courts, violated constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the reorganization act as constitutional.

Key Doctrines:

1. Abolition vs. Removal - What the act effects is abolition of office, not removal of officers. Abolition, when done in good faith, does not violate security of tenure

2. Legislative Authority to Abolish Courts - The legislature's authority to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court is undeniable, flowing from the power to create such courts

3. Good Faith Test - Abolition is valid when done in good faith and not for political or personal reasons

4. Necessity for Judicial Reform - The act was designed to remedy "monumental problems in the Judiciary" that clearly existed—it was for the legislature to decide what solutions to adopt

Bernas Commentary on De la Llana:

Nothing is better settled in our law than that reorganization need not be considered a circumvention of security of tenure if it is done in good faith. The Court distinguished between removal (which violates tenure) and abolition of office in good faith (which does not). The abolition was justified by the crying need for reform of the judiciary.

However, the new provision added in 1987—"No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members"—makes explicit what was implicit before. This does not affect the principle that reorganization by itself need not affect security of tenure, but it emphasizes that reorganization cannot be used as a pretext for purging judges.

Justice Teehankee's Dissent:

Teehankee argued that:

1. Express guarantee of security of tenure should prevail over the power to abolish merely implied from the power to create
2. The act achieved something short of abolition and substantial change
3. The spirit of enactment was not reorganization but using reorganization as an instrument for mass purge

Cruz Commentary:

Abolition of office is valid when done in good faith and not for political or personal reasons. In such situations, properly and logically speaking, there is no removal because removal implies the office exists after the ouster. This principle has been consistently applied—the same doctrine upheld judicial reorganization in Zandueta v. De la Costa and Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice.

Significance for Article VIII, Section 2:

This case interprets the relationship between Congressional power to organize courts and judges' security of tenure. The 1987 Constitution's addition of the second sentence in Section 2 codifies the Court's holding that while Congress may reorganize the judiciary, it may not use reorganization to undermine tenure. The case remains good law but with the constitutional caveat explicitly stated: reorganization is permissible, but not when it is a subterfuge for removing unwanted judges.

Post-1987 Application:

Under the 1987 Constitution, any judicial reorganization must survive scrutiny under both:

• The good faith test (from De la Llana)
• The explicit constitutional prohibition against undermining security of tenure

Courts must examine whether the "reorganization" is genuine reform or merely a vehicle for judicial purge.

SECTION 3: FISCAL AUTONOMY

Constitutional Text

"The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released."

Purpose of Fiscal Autonomy

Bernas Commentary:

The basic aim of granting fiscal autonomy to the judiciary is to assure its independence. The meaning of fiscal autonomy is expressed in the second sentence: appropriations may not be reduced below the prior year's amount, and approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The original Committee proposal had read: "An amount equivalent to not less than two percent of the national budget shall be automatically appropriated and regularly released for the judiciary." Delegate Monsod argued that pegging the budget at an arbitrary amount could result in wastage. He proposed what is now Section 3, saying the judiciary "should not be exempt from the budgetary process of submitting and justifying its budget, except that upon approval, it should be automatically and regularly released."

Three-Fold Protection

Fiscal autonomy provides three protections:

1. Prohibition Against Reduction - Legislature cannot reduce appropriations below the previous year's amount
2. Automatic Release - Approved appropriations must be automatically released (no executive impoundment)
3. Regular Release - Releases must occur regularly and predictably

Bernas Commentary:

These protections ensure the judiciary can plan and operate without fear that the executive or legislative branches will use budgetary control as leverage. This is particularly important given that courts often issue unpopular decisions against government officials or policies.

Cruz Commentary:

Fiscal autonomy means independence in budget preparation and submission, and guarantee against arbitrary reduction and interference by political branches. However, the judiciary remains subject to the budgetary process—it must justify its requests, but once approved, it receives full and automatic funding.

Relationship to Judicial Salaries

Section 3's fiscal autonomy works in tandem with Section 10's prohibition against salary diminution to create comprehensive financial protection for the judiciary.

📘 CASE STUDY: Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1987)

Facts: Three Regional Trial Court judges sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from withholding income taxes from their salaries, arguing this violated Article VIII, Section 10's prohibition: "The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall not be decreased during their continuance in office."

They relied on Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v. David, which held that income tax on judicial salaries constituted unconstitutional diminution. The Constitutional Commission debates revealed that framers deliberately deleted proposed language exempting judicial salaries from income tax.

Issue: Whether withholding income tax from judicial salaries constitutes a prohibited "decrease" under Article VIII, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No, income tax does NOT constitute a prohibited decrease. The Court explicitly discarded the Perfecto and Endencia doctrines.

Key Doctrines:

1. Tax Exemption Must Be Explicit - The Constitutional Commission deliberately rejected tax exemption for judges to ensure equality among all three branches of government in tax obligations

2. Diminution vs. Taxation - Taxation under general law applicable to all does not amount to "decrease" in salary as fixed by law—the salary itself remains unchanged

3. Framers' Intent Controls - Constitutional Commission debates show clear intent that judicial salaries remain taxable

From the Constitutional Commission Debates:

Commissioner Rigos explained that the proposed exemption was deleted because:

"The intention is that all officials of the government in all three branches, whether executive, legislative or judiciary, should be treated equally with respect to the payment of income tax... to promote equality."

Commissioner Bernas emphasized:

"The salary contemplated is the salary prescribed by law, and since it is prescribed by law, then it is subject to the general law on income tax... What we intend to prohibit is a diminution of that salary fixed by law."

Bernas Commentary in Nitafan:

The debates make clear that what the Constitution protects is the salary "fixed by law." If that salary is subject to generally applicable income tax, there is no unconstitutional diminution. The evil sought to be prevented is selective reduction of judicial salaries or targeted taxation—not participation in the universal tax system.

Significance for Fiscal Autonomy:

This case clarifies the scope of financial protections in Article VIII:

• Section 3 protects budgetary appropriations from reduction and interference
• Section 10 protects salaries from targeted reduction
• Neither provision creates tax exemption where none is explicitly granted

The decision establishes that judicial independence through fiscal autonomy does not mean judges are above the law or exempt from obligations all citizens bear. The non-diminution clause prevents vindictive or punitive salary cuts, not participation in generally applicable taxation.

Practical Application:

Post-Nitafan, judicial salaries are subject to:

• ☑︎ Income tax (applies to everyone)
• ☑︎ Any new tax of general application
• ⨯ Selective salary reductions targeting judges
• ⨯ Discriminatory taxation schemes
• ⨯ Any action reducing the salary "fixed by law"

CASE STUDY: Endencia v. David (1948) - Historical Context

Note: While Endencia was overruled by Nitafan, understanding this case provides important historical context for how judicial financial protections were once interpreted.

Facts: Justice Endencia of the Court of Appeals challenged withholding of income tax from his salary under the same constitutional non-diminution clause. The Republic Act provided that withholding should not be interpreted as violating the Constitution.

Original Ruling (Now Overruled):

The Court held that income tax collection constituted diminution:

"The collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution."

Three Key Holdings (All Now Overruled):

1. Mathematical Diminution - Tax withholding mathematically reduces take-home pay (Justice Endencia lost P72.68 per payday, 14.54% annually)

2. Legislature Cannot Override Judicial Interpretation - Congress cannot provide that a statute be interpreted in a way that avoids constitutional violation, thereby tying the hands of courts

3. Public Policy of Judicial Independence - Non-diminution exists to ensure judicial independence, not as personal benefit; revenue considerations are subordinate

Why This Case Matters Despite Being Overruled:

Endencia illustrates the evolution of constitutional interpretation. The 1987 Constitutional Commission specifically rejected this reasoning when it deliberately chose NOT to exempt judges from income tax. Nitafan's overruling of Endencia demonstrates that:

1. Constitutional interpretation must follow framers' intent
2. Prior case law yields to clear constitutional history
3. Judicial financial protections serve independence, not special privilege

Bernas Commentary on the Shift:

The overruling of Endencia reflects maturation in our understanding of fiscal autonomy. The Constitution protects the judiciary's institutional independence through budgetary guarantees (Section 3) and prohibits targeted salary reductions (Section 10), but it does not create a privileged class exempt from civic duties. The framers made a deliberate choice to ensure judges pay taxes like all other government officials.

SECTION 4: COMPOSITION AND VOTING REQUIREMENTS

Constitutional Text

"(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc."

Composition: Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices

Bernas Commentary:

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices, for a total of 15 members. The Constitution mandates that any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence. This requirement ensures continuity of the Court's work and prevents political manipulation through delayed appointments.

The Court may sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. This flexibility allows efficient handling of the Court's massive caseload while reserving en banc sessions for the most important matters.

En Banc vs. Division Requirements

Cases Requiring En Banc Hearing:

1. All cases involving constitutionality of:

   • Treaties
   • International agreements
   • Executive agreements
   • Laws
   • Presidential decrees
   • Proclamations
   • Orders
   • Instructions
   • Ordinances
   • Other regulations

2. Cases raising new doctrines or modifying/reversing prior decisions

3. Administrative matters (discipline of lower court judges, bar admission, rule-making)

Division Cases:

• All other matters may be heard by divisions
• Minimum three justices must concur for decision
• If required number not obtained, case goes to en banc

Voting Requirements

For En Banc Constitutional Cases:

• Majority of members who actually took part in deliberations AND voted

For Division Cases:

• Majority of members who actually took part in deliberations AND voted
• In no case without concurrence of at least three members
• If less than three concur, case must be decided en banc

Bernas Commentary:

The phrase "actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon" is critical. It means:

1. A Justice must have participated in deliberations (not just been present)
2. A Justice must have voted (abstentions don't count)
3. The majority is computed based on those who participated and voted, not the full membership

This prevents paralysis that could occur if the formula required a majority of all members regardless of participation. However, it also means a case could theoretically be decided by a small number if most justices inhibit themselves.

Doctrine of Judicial Stability

No Modification or Reversal Except En Banc:

The last sentence of Section 4(3) establishes the principle of stare decisis—no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

Cruz Commentary:

This provision ensures stability and predictability in the law. Parties are entitled to rely on established doctrines. A division cannot overrule another division or even an en banc decision. Only the full Court sitting en banc may modify or reverse established principles, ensuring that major shifts in jurisprudence receive the full Court's consideration.

SECTION 5: POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT

Constitutional Text

"The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. © All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law."

Original Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over:

1. Cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls - Based on international law and comity
2. Special civil actions:
   • Certiorari (review for lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion)
   • Prohibition (prevent lower tribunal from acting without or in excess of jurisdiction)
   • Mandamus (compel performance of ministerial duty)
   • Quo warranto (challenge to right to hold public office)
   • Habeas corpus (challenge unlawful detention)

Bernas Commentary:

The Constitution itself enumerates these cases of original jurisdiction, but this enumeration is not exclusive. Congress may expand original jurisdiction by law, but it may not diminish the constitutional minimum. The special civil actions listed are the traditional "prerogative writs" essential to checking governmental excess.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is categorized by subject matter:

Mandatory Appeal Cases:

• Constitutionality/validity challenges
• Tax/impost legality questions
• Lower court jurisdiction issues
• Criminal cases with reclusion perpetua or higher
• Pure questions of law

Bernas Commentary:

The enumeration in Section 5(2) represents the constitutionally protected appellate jurisdiction—Congress cannot remove these, though it may expand appellate jurisdiction to other matters. The provision ensures the Supreme Court remains the final arbiter on constitutional questions and serious criminal penalties.

Rule-Making Power

Section 5(5) grants expansive rule-making authority, subject to important limitations:

Scope of Rule-Making:

• Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
• Pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
• Admission to practice of law
• Integrated bar
• Legal assistance to the underprivileged

Constitutional Limitations on Rule-Making:

1. Rules shall provide simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition
2. Rules shall be uniform for courts of the same grade
3. Rules shall NOT diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights

Bernas Commentary:

The rule-making power is both a grant of authority and a limitation on Congress. Congress may not enact rules of procedure that conflict with Supreme Court rules. The exclusive power to regulate pleading, practice, and procedure ensures that the judiciary controls its own processes, free from legislative interference that could compromise independence.

The limitation that rules "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" distinguishes procedure (which the Court controls) from substantive law (which Congress enacts). However, the line between procedure and substance is not always clear, and the Court has sometimes validated rules that arguably affect substantive rights when justified by the need for judicial efficiency.

Bar Integration:

Bernas Commentary:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population, requiring membership and financial support as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law. The purposes of an Integrated Bar include:

1. Assist in administration of justice
2. Foster high ideals of integrity, learning, and professional competence
3. Safeguard professional interests of members
4. Cultivate spirit of cordiality and brotherhood
5. Provide forum for discussion of law and reform
6. Encourage legal education
7. Promote legal research
8. Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility

Cruz Commentary on Bar Integration:

The practice of law is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation by the State. When a lawyer enters the legal profession, he submits himself to regulations the State may establish for the common good. Bar integration does not compel association—the only compulsion is payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court may require that the cost of improving the profession be shared by its subjects and beneficiaries—the lawyers themselves.

Administrative Appointments

Section 5(6) grants the Supreme Court power to appoint all judiciary officials and employees "in accordance with the Civil Service Law."

Bernas Commentary:

This power safeguards judicial independence by preventing other branches from controlling judicial personnel. However, the requirement to follow Civil Service Law means appointments must comply with merit and fitness standards—judicial employees enjoy civil service protection, including security of tenure.

SECTION 6: ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION

Constitutional Text

"The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."

Scope of Administrative Supervision

Bernas Commentary:

Section 6 first appeared in the 1973 Constitution and is a significant innovation towards strengthening judicial independence. Hitherto, there was no constitutional provision on the subject, and administrative supervision over lower courts and their personnel was exercised by the Secretary of Justice, an executive officer. The situation was of doubtful constitutionality and occasioned uncomfortable moments in executive-judicial relations. The 1973 Constitution transferred administrative supervision to the Supreme Court, and attempts in the 1986 Constitutional Commission to return it to the Department of Justice failed.

Powers Included in Administrative Supervision

The power of administrative supervision includes:

1. Disciplinary Authority - Power to discipline judges of lower courts or order their dismissal by vote of majority of members who took part in deliberations (Section 11)
2. Investigation of Complaints - Power to investigate complaints against judges and court personnel
3. Enforcement of Rules - Power to ensure compliance with rules of court and administrative circulars
4. Management of Court Operations - Power to oversee efficient operation of all courts

Bernas Commentary:

The exclusivity of this power is jealously guarded by the Court. In Maceda v. Vasquez, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently of any administrative action of the Supreme Court: "Article VIII, Section 6 exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers."

CASE STUDY: Maceda v. Vasquez (1991)

Facts: Provincial Fiscal Maceda filed with the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) a sworn complaint against Judge Vasquez for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman initiated an investigation. Judge Vasquez moved to dismiss, arguing that under Article VIII, Section 6, only the Supreme Court has power to discipline judges.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may investigate judges independently of the Supreme Court's administrative supervision, or whether Article VIII, Section 6 grants exclusive investigatory and disciplinary authority to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The Ombudsman may not investigate judges independently. Article VIII, Section 6 grants exclusive administrative supervision to the Supreme Court.

Key Doctrines:

1. Exclusive Administrative Supervision - "Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk."

2. Separation of Powers Principle - "By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers."

3. Mandatory Referral Procedure - The Ombudsman may investigate judges only with respect to criminal charges, but must:

   • Refer administrative complaints to the Supreme Court
   • Refrain from prejudging administrative aspects
   • Not interfere with the Supreme Court's administrative determinations

Bernas Commentary in Maceda:

The Court's emphatic assertion of exclusivity serves vital purposes. If other branches could discipline judges for their judicial acts or administrative performance, this would create pressure points for influencing judicial decisions. A judge might hesitate to rule against a powerful executive official if that official's agency could initiate disciplinary proceedings. Section 6 eliminates this risk.

Practical Application:

After Maceda, complaints against judges follow this procedure:

Criminal Aspects:

• Ombudsman retains jurisdiction to investigate crimes
• May file criminal charges in regular courts
• Criminal prosecution does not require Supreme Court approval

Administrative Aspects:

• ALL administrative complaints must go to Supreme Court
• Ombudsman must refer administrative matters to Supreme Court
• Only Supreme Court may discipline for judicial performance or administrative infractions

Significance for Article VIII:

Maceda establishes that Section 6's grant of "administrative supervision" is comprehensive and exclusive:

• Comprehensive: Covers all aspects of judicial administration, including discipline, efficiency, and compliance
• Exclusive: No other branch may exercise administrative supervision over judiciary
• Protective: Shields judges from extra-judicial pressure or retaliation

This exclusive power is essential to judicial independence—without it, judges could be disciplined by officials whose decisions they must review or whose prosecutions they must try.

CASE STUDY: Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman (2003)

Facts: Complaints were filed with the Ombudsman against Judge Dolalas for undue delay in deciding a criminal case, violating Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Ombudsman initiated investigation. Judge Dolalas sought dismissal, invoking Maceda v. Vasquez.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may investigate judges for administrative charges of undue delay in deciding cases, or whether such matters fall exclusively under Supreme Court supervision per Article VIII, Section 6.

Ruling: The Ombudsman cannot investigate. The complaint is essentially administrative and falls within Supreme Court's exclusive administrative supervision under Article VIII, Section 6.

Key Doctrines:

1. Nature of Charge Determines Jurisdiction - Charges that essentially concern compliance with judicial administrative rules and the Code of Judicial Conduct are administrative, not criminal, even if styled as violations of anti-graft laws

2. Determination Requires Judicial Expertise - "The resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter."

3. Mandatory Referral Applied - Even if filed with the Ombudsman, such complaints must be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action

From the Court's Analysis:

"Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."

"This Court, in the case of Maceda v. Vasquez, held that: Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge's and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers."

Bernas Commentary on Dolalas:

Dolalas clarifies that the test is not the label placed on the charge, but its essential nature. If resolution requires interpretation of judicial rules, evaluation of judicial performance against court standards, or determination whether a judge complied with administrative circulars, the charge is administrative. The Ombudsman cannot bootstrap jurisdiction by characterizing judicial performance issues as violations of anti-graft laws.

Practical Guidance from Dolalas:

Administrative Charges (Supreme Court Exclusive):

• Undue delay in deciding cases
• Violations of Code of Judicial Conduct
• Non-compliance with administrative circulars
• Failure to meet case disposition requirements
• Judicial misconduct in court management

Criminal Charges (Ombudsman Jurisdiction):

• Bribery
• Graft and corruption involving non-judicial transactions
• Crimes unrelated to judicial functions
• Criminal acts even if occurring in judicial context (but administrative aspect still goes to Supreme Court)

Significance for Article VIII, Section 6:

Dolalas demonstrates that Section 6's administrative supervision extends beyond obvious disciplinary matters to encompass all aspects of judicial performance and compliance with judicial standards. This ensures:

1. Expertise Principle - Those most knowledgeable about judicial functions (Supreme Court) determine judicial performance
2. Independence Protection - Prevents prosecutors from disciplining judges whose decisions displease them
3. Unified Standards - Maintains consistent standards for judicial conduct across the judiciary
4. Due Process - Ensures judges are evaluated by those who understand judicial realities

Together, Maceda and Dolalas establish that Article VIII, Section 6 creates an impermeable shield protecting judicial administrative matters from external interference.

CASE STUDY: Drilon v. Lim (1994)

Facts: Section 187 of the Local Government Code allowed appeals of local tax ordinances to the Secretary of Justice on grounds of "constitutionality or legality." Manila enacted a Revenue Code. Oil companies appealed to Secretary Drilon, who declared it void for procedural non-compliance and ultra vires provisions. Manila challenged this, arguing that allowing the Secretary of Justice to review ordinances violated local autonomy and exceeded executive authority.

Issue: Whether Section 187 unconstitutionally grants the Secretary of Justice power to "control" local governments, or whether it validly allows executive "supervision" consistent with Article X, Section 4's provision that "The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments."

Ruling: Section 187 is constitutional. The Secretary exercises supervision, not control.

Key Doctrines:

1. Supervision vs. Control Distinguished:

SUPERVISION:

• Ensuring compliance with law
• Checking legality
• Ordering compliance with prescribed rules
• No discretion to modify rules
• Focus: Legality and adherence to law

CONTROL:

• Laying down rules
• Determining wisdom/policy
• Substituting own judgment
• Discretion to modify/replace acts
• Focus: Wisdom and policy choices

2. Secretary of Justice Exercises Supervision - When the Secretary reviews only "constitutionality or legality," this is supervision. If the Secretary could review "wisdom" or "reasonableness," this would be control.

3. Contrast with Prior Law - The old Local Autonomy Act (BP 337) gave the Secretary of Finance power to suspend ordinances deemed "unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory"—this WAS control because it involved judgment about wisdom.

From the Court's Analysis:

"SUPERVISION is not a meaningless word. 'To supervise' is to 'survey or oversee the execution and performance of.' 'The power of supervision is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.'

CONTROL, on the other hand, 'is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.'

Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds: the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. He has no discretion on this matter."

Bernas Commentary on Supervision:

The distinction between supervision and control is fundamental to understanding executive power structure. A supervisor ensures the law is followed—he cannot substitute his policy preferences. A controller can replace judgments even when the subordinate acted legally. The Constitution grants the President only supervisory power over local governments, preserving local autonomy while ensuring compliance with national law.

Significance for Article VIII:

While Drilon principally concerns Article VII (Executive) and Article X (Local Government), it has important implications for understanding Article VIII, Section 6's grant of "administrative supervision" to the Supreme Court:

Parallel Structure:

• Article VII: President exercises "supervision" over local governments
• Article VIII: Supreme Court exercises "administrative supervision" over courts

Shared Principle: The supervision/control distinction applies to judicial administration:

• Supreme Court CAN ensure lower courts follow procedural rules and judicial standards
• Supreme Court CANNOT substitute its judgment on how judges run their courts (within legal bounds)
• Supreme Court focuses on legality and compliance, not micromanagement

Distinction: Unlike the President's supervisory power (which is limited because of local autonomy), the Supreme Court's administrative supervision is more comprehensive because:

1. All courts are part of one unified judicial system
2. No competing autonomy principle applies
3. Judicial independence requires centralized protection and standardization

The Court's holding in Drilon that executive review limited to "legality" constitutes supervision, not control, reinforces that Section 6's "administrative supervision" authorizes the Supreme Court to ensure legal compliance throughout the judiciary without being characterized as "control" that would undermine the independence of individual judges within their jurisdictions.

SECTION 7: QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES

Constitutional Text

"No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar."

Supreme Court Qualifications (Constitutional Minimum)

For Supreme Court Justices:

1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least 40 years of age
3. For 15 years or more:
   • A judge of a lower court, OR
   • Engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines

Bernas Commentary:

The Constitution establishes minimum qualifications for Supreme Court justices but allows combination of judicial and legal experience. "Fifteen years or more" means the candidate may combine judicial service and law practice to meet the requirement. However, only active practice counts—periods of non-practice or practice in other capacities (e.g., corporate positions not involving legal work) do not count toward the fifteen years.

Lower Court Qualifications

Constitutional Minimum for All Judges:

1. Citizen of the Philippines (need not be natural-born for lower courts)
2. Member of the Philippine Bar

Additional Requirements (Set by Congress): Congress may prescribe additional qualifications by law, typically including:

• Minimum years of legal practice
• Age requirements
• Moral fitness
• Physical and mental fitness

Cruz Commentary:

The less stringent citizenship requirement for lower court judges (citizen vs. natural-born) recognizes that naturalized citizens who have demonstrated loyalty to the Philippines should not be barred from judicial service at lower levels. However, Supreme Court positions require natural-born citizenship given the Court's role as final arbiter of constitutional questions affecting national sovereignty.

Disqualifications and Other Requirements

Beyond constitutional minimums, jurisprudence and statutes establish additional requirements:

Bernas Commentary:

The fact that a prospective judge failed to disclose that he had been administratively charged and dismissed from service for grave misconduct by a former President was used against him. It did not matter that he had resigned from office and that the administrative case had become moot and academic.

Similarly, before one offered appointment to the Supreme Court can accept, he must correct the entry in his birth certificate saying that he is an alien. This was the case of Justice Gregory Ong of the Sandiganbayan who was offered appointment to the Supreme Court. Eventually Ong declined to accept, but remained in the Sandiganbayan. But since a Sandiganbayan justice must also be a natural-born Filipino citizen, his removal was sought by a private individual. The Court ruled that a quo warranto proceeding may be commenced only by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the office.

SECTIONS 8-10: JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT PROCESS

Constitutional Text - Section 8

"(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments...

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."

Constitutional Text - Section 9

"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation."

The Innovation: Judicial and Bar Council

Bernas Commentary:

A significant innovation introduced by the 1986 Constitutional Commission is the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council. The principal function of the Council is to recommend to the President appointees to the Judiciary. This substantially reduces presidential discretion while removing the need for Commission on Appointments confirmation—a process that had been criticized for excessive politicization of judicial appointments.

JBC Composition

Ex Officio Members:

1. Chief Justice (Chairman)
2. Secretary of Justice
3. Representative of Congress (from either House or Senate)

Regular Members (4-year terms with CA confirmation): 4. Representative of the Integrated Bar 5. Professor of law 6. Retired Member of the Supreme Court 7. Representative of the private sector

Bernas Commentary:

The provision for a Congressional representative was formulated for a unicameral Congress, and no change was made when the final decision was for bicameral Congress. In practice, the two houses now work out a way of sharing representation.

Appointment Process

Step 1: JBC Screening

• JBC evaluates all applicants
• Conducts interviews and reviews qualifications
• Prepares list of at least three nominees for each vacancy

Step 2: Presidential Appointment

• President appoints from JBC list
• No confirmation required
• President has 90 days to fill Supreme Court vacancies (Section 4)

Step 3: For Lower Courts

• President issues appointments within 90 days from submission of JBC list

Bernas Commentary:

The JBC system serves multiple purposes:

1. Professionalization - Ensures nominees meet rigorous standards
2. Depoliticization - Reduces political influence by interposing expert screening
3. Transparency - Creates visible, structured process
4. Judicial Independence - No CA confirmation means no legislative leverage
5. Timeliness - 90-day requirement prevents prolonged vacancies

SECTION 11: TENURE AND DISCIPLINE

Constitutional Text

"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."

Security of Tenure

Judges enjoy security of tenure, removable only by:

For Supreme Court Justices:

• Impeachment (Article XI, Section 2)
• Reaching age 70
• Incapacity

For Lower Court Judges:

• Discipline/dismissal by Supreme Court en banc (majority vote of those who participated)
• Reaching age 70
• Incapacity

Bernas Commentary:

Security of tenure is the cornerstone of judicial independence. A judge who fears removal for unpopular decisions cannot judge impartially. The Constitution protects tenure through multiple mechanisms:

1. "Good behavior" standard (not "at pleasure")
2. Specified age limit (70 years) providing predictability
3. Limited grounds for removal
4. For Supreme Court, impeachment requires supermajority
5. For lower courts, only Supreme Court may discipline (preventing executive/legislative retaliation)

"During Good Behavior"

Cruz Commentary:

The phrase "good behavior" means judges hold office indefinitely unless they engage in misconduct. This is in contrast to tenure "at pleasure" (removable anytime) or fixed term (ending at specified date). Good behavior tenure provides maximum security, removable only for cause.

Mandatory Retirement at Age 70

Bernas Commentary:

The mandatory retirement age of 70 years provides certainty and prevents judges from clinging to office beyond their effectiveness. It also ensures regular turnover, allowing new perspectives and preventing the judiciary from becoming calcified. The fixed age rule eliminates disputes about whether a judge remains mentally competent—at 70, retirement is automatic regardless of actual capacity.

Incapacity

Bernas Commentary:

Incapacity to discharge the duties of office is not defined by the Constitution. Neither does the Constitution specify who should decide whether a judge has become incapacitated. The power to determine incapacity is part of the overall administrative power which the Supreme Court has over its members and over all members of the judiciary. The practice is for the Supreme Court to create a panel of doctors who can assist in making the proper decision.

Power to Discipline Lower Court Judges

The Supreme Court en banc has exclusive power to:

• Discipline judges of lower courts
• Order their dismissal
• Requires majority vote of members who actually took part in deliberations and voted

Bernas Commentary:

The power to discipline judges of inferior courts or to order their dismissal is exclusive. It may not be vested in any other body. Nor may Congress pass a law that judges of lower courts are removable only by impeachment. The Constitution is clear: Supreme Court Justices are removable only by impeachment, but judges of inferior courts are removable only by the Supreme Court sitting en banc.

SECTION 12: PROHIBITION ON NON-JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENTS

Constitutional Text

"The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions."

Purpose of the Prohibition

Bernas Commentary:

The provision merely makes explicit an application of the principle of separation of powers. Judges should focus exclusively on their judicial functions and not be distracted by executive or administrative duties. Additionally, assigning judges to executive agencies creates conflicts of interest and appearance of impropriety.

Application in Jurisprudence

Bernas Commentary:

Where a judge was designated member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice by the Provincial Governor, where the function of the Committee was to receive complaints and make recommendations towards speedy disposition of cases of detainees, the designation was invalidated. The Court said the functions "involved the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as were devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence." The functions were deemed covered by the prohibition under Section 12. (In re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, 1988)

Permissible Activities

Judges may:

• Teach law (not considered "practice of profession" for constitutional purposes)
• Engage in scholarly writing
• Participate in judicial education programs
• Serve on committees directly related to judicial administration

Judges may not:

• Hold executive office
• Serve on regulatory commissions
• Perform quasi-judicial functions for executive agencies
• Accept designation to administrative bodies

Cruz Commentary:

The Constitution permits certain activities that enhance judicial performance (teaching, writing) while prohibiting those that create divided loyalties or compromise judicial independence. The test is whether the activity conflicts with judicial duties or creates appearance of impropriety.

SECTION 13: DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Constitutional Text

"The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts."

Pre-Assignment Consultation Requirement

Bernas Commentary:

This provision mandates a specific decisional process:

1. Consultation First - Justices must reach conclusions through consultation
2. Then Assignment - Only after consultation is the case assigned to a Justice for opinion writing
3. Certification - Chief Justice certifies compliance
4. Copy to Record - Certification attached to record and served on parties

This ensures decisions represent collective deliberation, not just the views of the assigned writer. It prevents "surprise" decisions where justices learn the Court's position only when they read the draft opinion.

Transparency Requirements

Justices who:

• Took no part
• Dissented
• Abstained

Must state reasons for their position.

Bernas Commentary:

This transparency requirement serves multiple purposes:

1. Accountability - Public knows why each justice voted as they did
2. Recusal Clarity - When justice takes no part, reason explains any potential conflict
3. Dissent Documentation - Preserves minority views for future consideration
4. Public Confidence - Transparent process builds trust in judiciary

Application to Lower Collegiate Courts

The same requirements apply to:

• Court of Appeals
• Sandiganbayan
• Court of Tax Appeals
• Any other collegiate court created by law

Cruz Commentary:

Requiring lower collegiate courts to follow the same process as the Supreme Court ensures uniformity in judicial deliberation throughout the system. It prevents lower courts from adopting shortcuts that might compromise decision quality.

SECTIONS 14-16: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Section 14: Publication Requirement

"No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor."

Bernas Commentary:

This provision serves dual purposes:

1. Reasoned Decisions - Courts must explain their reasoning, enabling review and promoting accountability
2. Denial Explanations - Even denials of petitions must be explained, preventing arbitrary dismissals

The requirement that decisions express "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law" means parties and the public can understand why the court ruled as it did. This facilitates appellate review and builds public confidence.

Section 15: Publication of Decisions

"All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last required pleading, brief, or memorandum, or the expiration of the period for its filing.

Failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period shall not result in additional compensation or other benefits.

All decisions, however, must be published and made available to the public and must state the names of the parties and the ponente of the decision."

Periods for Decision:

• Supreme Court: 24 months
• Lower collegiate courts: 12 months (unless Supreme Court reduces)
• Other lower courts: 3 months

Bernas Commentary:

These deadlines promote efficiency and prevent undue delay. However, they are not jurisdictional—failure to decide within the period does not invalidate the decision when rendered. But judges who fail to meet deadlines face:

1. Administrative sanctions
2. Loss of additional compensation/benefits
3. Negative evaluation for promotion

Publication Requirement:

All decisions must:

• Be published and made available to public
• State names of parties
• State name of ponente (justice who wrote the opinion)

Section 16: Salary Protection

"The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary."

Bernas Commentary:

The annual report requirement ensures transparency and accountability while respecting judicial independence. The report allows the political branches and public to understand judicial operations without compromising decisional independence. Topics typically covered include:

1. Caseload statistics
2. Pending cases
3. Administrative improvements
4. Budgetary needs
5. Recommendations for legislative action

This creates a feedback loop where the judiciary communicates needs and the political branches can respond through appropriate legislation—all without compromising the judiciary's independence in deciding cases.

INTEGRATED CASE LAW ANALYSIS

Cases Already Discussed

We have already examined in detail:

1. Marcos v. Manglapus (1989) - Expanded judicial review; grave abuse of discretion standard; residual presidential powers; political questions post-1987
2. Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo (2012) - Presidential immunity; command responsibility; accountability in human rights cases
3. Ople v. Torres (1998) - Limits on executive orders; right to privacy; judicial review of executive action
4. In re Bermudez (1986) - Political questions; presidential immunity; government legitimacy
5. De la Llana v. Alba (1984) - Judicial reorganization; security of tenure; abolition vs. removal
6. Nitafan v. CIR (1987) - Non-diminution clause; judicial salaries and taxation
7. Endencia v. David (1948) - Historical context (overruled by Nitafan)
8. Maceda v. Vasquez (1991) - Exclusive administrative supervision; Ombudsman limitations
9. Dolalas v. Ombudsman (2003) - Administrative vs. criminal jurisdiction over judges
10. Drilon v. Lim (1994) - Supervision vs. control; executive review powers

Additional Cases to Integrate

📘 CASE STUDY: IBP v. Zamora (2000)

Facts: In response to alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila (robberies, kidnappings, carnappings), President Estrada issued a verbal directive ordering PNP and Philippine Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols. This was confirmed through a Memorandum invoking commander-in-chief powers under Article VII, Section 18. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines challenged the deployment as unconstitutional, arguing it violated civilian supremacy over the military (Article II, Section 3) and the civilian character of the PNP (Article XVI, Section 5[4]).

Issue: Whether the President committed grave abuse of discretion in exercising his calling-out power under Article VII, Section 18 by deploying Marines to assist PNP in joint patrols, and whether such deployment violates constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy and the civilian character of police.

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the President's calling-out power.

Key Doctrines:

1. Calling-Out Power is Discretionary - Article VII, Section 18 vests full discretionary power in the President to determine when it becomes necessary to call out armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence

2. Most Benign Commander-in-Chief Power - The calling-out power is the least intrusive of presidential commander-in-chief powers (compared to suspension of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law, which curtail civil rights)

3. No Pre-Conditions for Calling Out - Unlike suspension of habeas corpus or martial law (which require invasion, rebellion, or imminent danger), calling out requires only "whenever it becomes necessary"

4. Judicial Review Applies But Is Deferential - While the power is not a political question immune from review, courts will not substitute their judgment for the President's unless the exercise was "totally bereft of factual basis"

Court's Analysis:

The Court found sufficient factual basis:

• President asserted violent crimes continued to occur in Metro Manila
• Court took judicial notice of recent bombings in shopping malls and public places
• Burden on petitioner to show lack of factual basis—IBP failed to discharge this burden

On civilian supremacy:

• Marines' participation was appropriately circumscribed
• Local police forces remained in charge at all times
• Metro Manila Police Chief was overall leader of joint patrols
• Police directed and managed deployment
• Marines rendered "nothing more than assistance"
• No Marine was incorporated as PNP member (no appointment to civilian post)

Bernas Commentary on IBP v. Zamora:

The calling-out power represents the President's flexibility to respond to threats short of those requiring suspension of habeas corpus or martial law. The Constitution wisely grants the President discretion while subjecting it to judicial review under the "grave abuse of discretion" standard. This balance respects executive competence in security matters while preventing authoritarian excess.

Importantly, the Court found that military assistance to civilian authorities has long been accepted in Philippine governance (elections, disaster relief, anti-drug operations), constituting a "gloss on executive power" from systematic executive practice never questioned by Congress.

Significance for Article VIII:

IBP v. Zamora demonstrates how Article VIII's expanded judicial power operates in practice:

1. Broad But Not Unlimited Review - Courts CAN review commander-in-chief powers (rejecting old "political question" immunity), but review is deferential when:

   • Constitution textually commits discretion to President
   • Factual necessity is not easily quantifiable
   • President has access to classified intelligence
   • Emergency situations require quick decisions

2. Burden of Proof on Challenger - Petitioner must show the President acted "totally bereft of factual basis"—not merely that the President could have acted differently

3. Separation of Powers Balance - The Court respects executive expertise in security matters while retaining power to check arbitrary action

4. Standing Flexibility - Court relaxed standing requirements due to "transcendental importance" of constitutional issues, demonstrating willingness to reach merits of important cases even when technical requirements not fully met

The case illustrates that Article VIII, Section 1's elimination of prudential political questions does not mean courts second-guess every executive security decision—rather, courts ensure decisions have rational basis without substituting judicial judgment for executive expertise.

THEMATIC SYNTHESIS: ARTICLE VIII IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Theme 1: Independence Through Institutional Design

The 1987 Constitution creates judicial independence through multiple reinforcing mechanisms:

Financial Independence:

• Fiscal autonomy (Section 3)
• Automatic release of appropriations
• Prohibition against budget reduction
• Non-diminution of salaries (Section 10)

Appointment Independence:

• JBC screening (Section 8)
• No CA confirmation (Section 9)
• 90-day filling requirement (Section 4)

Operational Independence:

• Administrative supervision (Section 6)
• Rule-making power (Section 5)
• Appointment of personnel (Section 5)

Tenure Protection:

• Good behavior tenure (Section 11)
• Specific removal procedures
• Prohibition against reorganization undermining tenure (Section 2)

Bernas Commentary:

These mechanisms reflect lessons learned from the Marcos era when judicial independence was systematically undermined. The framers understood that independence requires not just rhetorical commitment but concrete institutional protections against executive and legislative pressure.

Theme 2: Expanded Judicial Power and Its Limits

The Revolution:

Article VIII, Section 1's second paragraph eliminated "prudential" political questions:

Before 1987:

• Courts could refuse to decide cases citing institutional difficulties
• "Political question" doctrine broadly applied
• Executive action often unreviewable

After 1987:

• Duty to determine grave abuse of discretion
• Presumption of justiciability
• Political questions narrowly construed

But Limits Remain:

Bernas Commentary:

While the second paragraph of Section 1 eliminated prudential political questions, it preserved classical political questions—matters the Constitution textually commits to other branches. Examples include:

• Whom to recognize as foreign governments (President)
• Whom to pardon (President)
• Whom to elect (People)
• What policies to pursue (Political branches)

The distinction is crucial: Courts now review WHETHER an official acted with grave abuse (justiciable), but not WHETHER the official made the best decision (political).

Cruz Commentary:

The expanded judicial power does not make courts super-legislatures or super-executives. Courts determine legality, not wisdom. Courts answer whether government acted within constitutional bounds, not whether government acted wisely within those bounds.

Theme 3: Accountability and Transparency

The 1987 Constitution makes the judiciary more transparent and accountable:

Decision-Making Transparency:

• Consultation requirement (Section 13)
• Reasons for dissent/abstention (Section 13)
• Publication of decisions (Section 15)

Performance Accountability:

• Mandatory time periods for decisions (Section 15)
• Annual reports to Congress (Section 16)
• Public availability of decisions (Section 15)

But Preserves Independence:

• No legislative/executive review of decisions
• No political accountability for decisions' content
• Accountability is to law and Constitution, not public opinion

Bernas Commentary:

The Constitution strikes a delicate balance—judges must be transparent and efficient, but they are not subject to political control. They answer for delay, corruption, or incompetence, but never for the content of their decisions. This distinguishes judicial accountability from political accountability—judges are accountable to law, not to voters or politicians.

Theme 4: Relationship with Other Branches

Checks on Executive:

• Judicial review of executive actions (Section 1)
• Review of appointments (quo warranto jurisdiction)
• Review of commander-in-chief powers (IBP v. Zamora)
• Protection of constitutional rights (Ople v. Torres)

Checks on Legislature:

• Judicial review of statutes (Section 5)
• Protection of core judicial functions from legislative interference
• Rule-making power immune from legislative override

Executive/Legislative Checks on Judiciary:

• Presidential appointment (with JBC screening)
• Congressional budget appropriation (but no reduction)
• Legislative determination of lower court jurisdiction
• Impeachment of Supreme Court justices

Bernas Commentary:

The Constitution creates genuine separation of powers with meaningful checks and balances. The judiciary is neither subservient to nor dominant over the political branches. Each branch has its sphere of authority, and each can check abuses by others. This reflects Madison's insight that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition"—institutional design, not merely good intentions, protects liberty.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Application 1: Pandemic Response and Judicial Review

The COVID-19 pandemic tested the boundaries of executive power and judicial review:

Example: Enhanced Community Quarantine measures restricted movement and assembly. Citizens challenged these as unconstitutional. Courts applied IBP v. Zamora's deferential standard—so long as measures had factual basis and did not amount to grave abuse, courts upheld executive discretion in public health emergency.

Lesson: Article VIII's expanded judicial power means courts CAN review emergency measures (no political question immunity), but courts remain deferential to executive expertise in genuine emergencies with factual foundation.

Application 2: Judicial Independence Under Pressure

Recent controversies over judicial appointments and disciplinary actions test Article VIII's protections:

Example: Chief Justice impeachment proceedings and subsequent appointment controversies raised questions about politicization of judiciary. Article VIII's protections (JBC screening, no CA confirmation, security of tenure) remain crucial safeguards, but depend on good-faith implementation.

Lesson: Constitutional protections work only when actors respect them. The strongest constitutional text cannot prevent determined abuse—but it raises costs of abuse and provides rallying points for defenders of independence.

Application 3: Court Efficiency and Case Backlogs

Section 15's time periods for decision remain aspirational rather than actual:

Reality: Courts face massive backlogs; 3-month period for lower courts widely unmet

Responses:

• Administrative reforms (case management systems)
• Additional judicial positions
• Alternative dispute resolution
• Continuous trial system

Lesson: Constitutional mandates require adequate resources. Fiscal autonomy (Section 3) provides legal basis for courts to demand necessary funding, but resource allocation remains partially political.

Application 4: Technology and Judicial Modernization

The Constitution does not explicitly address technology, but Article VIII provides framework:

Rule-Making Power (Section 5[5]): Supreme Court can promulgate rules allowing:

• Electronic filing
• Virtual hearings
• Digital evidence
• Online publication of decisions

Limitation: Rules "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights"—so technology must enhance access without compromising due process.

CONCLUSION: ARTICLE VIII IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Article VIII represents the 1987 Constitution's commitment to judicial independence and meaningful judicial review. Its innovations—fiscal autonomy, the JBC, expanded judicial power, administrative supervision—create a framework for a genuinely independent judiciary capable of checking abuses by other branches.

Enduring Strengths:

1. Comprehensive protections for independence
2. Clear grant of review power over executive and legislative action
3. Balance between independence and accountability
4. Flexibility for modernization through rule-making

Continuing Challenges:

1. Resource constraints despite fiscal autonomy
2. Political pressure despite constitutional protections
3. Case backlogs despite time limits
4. Public confidence amid controversies

Bernas's Final Thoughts:

Article VIII succeeds if it produces judges who are independent in three senses:

1. Institutionally independent - Protected from external pressure
2. Intellectually independent - Free to follow the law wherever it leads
3. Personally independent - Possessed of integrity to resist temptation and pressure

The Constitution can provide institutional independence through its structural protections. It cannot directly create intellectual or personal independence—those depend on the character of individuals appointed. But by creating rigorous screening (JBC) and removing political pressures (no CA confirmation, security of tenure, fiscal autonomy), the Constitution makes it more likely that persons of integrity and intellect will be appointed and that, once appointed, they can act according to their oath.

Cruz's Final Thoughts:

The judiciary's role is to apply the law, not to make it. Article VIII empowers courts to check constitutional violations by any branch or instrumentality of government, but this is not license for judicial supremacy or activism. Courts are powerful but must wield power with restraint—striking down only clear constitutional violations, respecting the political branches' policy prerogatives, and remembering that in a democracy, elected representatives presumptively speak for the people.

A judiciary is successful not when it imposes its will, but when it vindicates constitutional rights, ensures governmental adherence to law, and earns public respect through impartial, principled adjudication.

APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF KEY CASES

APPENDIX: ARTICLE VIII FULL TEXT

ARTICLE VIII - THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, That no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

© All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

SECTION 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last required pleading, brief, or memorandum, or the expiration of the period for its filing.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.

This learning material synthesizes constitutional text, commentary from Bernas and Cruz, and jurisprudence from 11 landmark cases to provide comprehensive understanding of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.