Study Guide: Articles 16-20 of the Revised Penal Code

04 Nov, 2025

Buy me ADHD meds or

A study guide by Mychal Sajulga.

COMPREHENSIVE LEARNING MATERIAL: ARTICLES 16-20 REVISED PENAL CODE

Persons Criminally Liable & Application of Penalties

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. [Article 16: Who Are Criminally Liable]
2. [Article 17: Principals]
3. [Article 18: Accomplices]
4. [Article 19: Accessories]
5. [Article 20: Accessories Exempt from Liability]
6. [Penalty Tables and Applications]
7. [Comprehensive Case Digest]
8. [Commentary Summary]

ARTICLE 16: WHO ARE CRIMINALLY LIABLE

CODAL PROVISION (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:

1. Principals
2. Accomplices
3. Accessories

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals
2. Accomplices

CORE PRINCIPLES

1. Classification by Severity of Felony

The Revised Penal Code distinguishes criminal liability based on whether the felony is grave, less grave, or light:

• Grave felonies (Art. 9): Those to which the law attaches capital punishment or afflictive penalties
• Less grave felonies (Art. 9): Those punished with correctional penalties in their maximum period
• Light felonies (Art. 9): Infractions punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding ₱200, or both

2. Accessories Not Liable for Light Felonies

Boado's Commentary: Under Article 16, only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies. Accessories are not punishable because a light felony is penalized with arresto menor. Accessories receive a penalty two degrees lower than the principal, which would be two degrees below arresto menor—a penalty that does not exist in the Revised Penal Code. This follows the maxim "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does not deal with trifles).

Reyes' Commentary: Accessories are not criminally liable for light felonies because the penalty would be so insignificant as to be non-existent in the graduated scale. The law recognizes that pursuing such minimal liability would be impractical and contrary to the principle of proportionality in punishment.

3. Application to Special Laws

Campanilla's Commentary: The suppletory application of Article 16 extends to special laws. For instance, conspiracy principles under Articles 16-18 have been applied to violations of special laws like B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law), following the doctrine in Ladonga v. People and Yu, G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004.

Boado's Commentary: The provisions on principals, accomplices, and accessories under Articles 16-18 have been extended by jurisprudence to special penal laws. In U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379, the Court applied Article 17 (principals) to the crime of misappropriation of public funds under Act 1740. Similarly, in Bruhez, Article 45 was applied concerning confiscation of instruments used in violation of the Opium Law.

ARTICLE 17: PRINCIPALS

CODAL PROVISION (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act [Principals by Direct Participation];

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it [Principals by Induction]; and

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished [Principals by Indispensable Cooperation].

CORE PRINCIPLES

A. PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION (Par. 1)

Definition and Elements

Reyes' Commentary: Principals by direct participation are those who personally execute the criminal act, actually taking part in its execution. They are the material authors or executors of the crime.

Requirements:

1. Direct participation in the execution of the criminal act
2. Personal intervention in the commission of the crime

Conspiracy and Direct Participation

Boado's Commentary: When conspiracy exists, all conspirators are considered principals by direct participation, regardless of the extent or modality of their individual participation. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators, and the precise extent of each conspirator's participation becomes secondary.

Quantum of Proof for Conspiracy (Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996):

• Conspiracy must be proved with the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime itself
• It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
• It cannot be presumed—mere simultaneous presence or similar actions are insufficient
• Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt

How Conspiracy is Proven (Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007): Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indicate:

• Joint purpose
• Concerted action
• Community of interest/sentiments

Boado notes: Direct proof of conspiracy is not essential—it may be inferred from the mode, manner, and circumstances of the crime's perpetration.

Inducement vs. Command

Reyes' Commentary: Inducement comprises:

• Price or reward
• Promise
• Command
• Pacto (agreement)

Boado's Commentary (Tamayo, 44 Phil 38): The moral influence of words of command may determine conduct. A father's words may induce a son to commit a crime where the same words from a stranger would make no impression. This recognizes the psychological power of authority figures.

B. PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION (Par. 2)

Definition and Elements

Reyes' Commentary: Principals by induction are those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime. The term "inducement" encompasses price, promise of reward, command, and agreement (People vs. Gensola, No. L-24491, Sept. 30, 1969).

Two Ways of Becoming Principal by Induction:

1. By Directly Forcing Another to Commit a Crime:

• Using irresistible force (Art. 12, par. 5)
• Causing uncontrollable fear (Art. 12, par. 6)

Note: In these cases, there is no conspiracy—only the inducer is criminally liable. The material executor is exempt under Article 12.

2. By Directly Inducing Another to Commit a Crime:

• Giving price or offering reward or promise
• Using words of command

Note: Both the inducer and the executor have collective criminal responsibility.

Requisites for Principal by Induction

Reyes' Commentary (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203):

1. The inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime

2. The inducement must be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor

Boado's Commentary: To constitute inducement, there must exist:

• The most positive resolution on the part of the inducer
• The most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime
• Presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation

Illustrations from Jurisprudence

Case 1: Promise of Pecuniary Gain (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244): When the accused, blinded by grudge against the deceased, caused her co-accused through promise of pecuniary gain to shoot the victim with a gun she furnished, she clearly had the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. The promise was the determining cause.

Case 2: Paramour's Proposition (U.S. vs. Alcontin): A married woman suggested to her paramour that he kill her husband so they could live together freely. The proposition constituted more than mere counsel or advice—it was coupled with a consideration which, given their relationship, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the killing.

Principal by Induction Must Wait for Execution

Reyes' Commentary (People vs. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788): One cannot be held guilty of instigating the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime was actually committed by another. The liability of the principal by induction is derivative and dependent upon the actual commission by the principal by direct participation.

C. PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION (Par. 3)

Definition and Elements

Reyes' Commentary: Principals by indispensable cooperation are those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

Requirements:

1. Participation in the criminal resolution (shared criminal intent)
2. Cooperation in the commission by performing another act
3. Such cooperation must be indispensable (i.e., without it, the crime would not have been accomplished)

Boado's Commentary: The cooperation must be:

• Necessary and essential to the commission of the crime
• Directly related to the criminal act
• Performed with knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal by direct participation

Distinguishing from Accomplice

Reyes' Commentary: The key difference lies in indispensability:

• Principal by Indispensable Cooperation: Without his act, the crime would NOT have been accomplished
• Accomplice: His cooperation aids execution but is NOT indispensable; the crime could have been accomplished without him

Test: Would the crime have been committed in substantially the same manner without the cooperation? If yes, he is an accomplice. If no, he is a principal.

D. COLLECTIVE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Reyes' Commentary: Collective criminal responsibility exists when offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the same for all.

Who Has Collective Criminal Responsibility:

1. All principals by direct participation
2. Principal by induction (except when using irresistible force/uncontrollable fear) + principal by direct participation
3. Principal by indispensable cooperation + principal by direct participation

E. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Reyes' Commentary (U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386): In the absence of conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose, or community of criminal design, criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one person is individual, not collective. Each participant is liable only for the act committed by him.

Example (People vs. Martinez, 42 Phil. 85): Three individuals were assaulted by the deceased with a knife. In incomplete self-defense, two caused less serious physical injuries while the third inflicted the fatal wound. Individual responsibility applies:

• The one who inflicted the fatal wound: liable for homicide
• The other two: liable only for less serious physical injuries

APPLICATION TO SPECIAL LAWS

Boado's Commentary: Article 17 has suppletory application to special laws (U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379). The principles of principals apply to crimes defined in special laws unless the special law provides otherwise.

ARTICLE 18: ACCOMPLICES

CODAL PROVISION (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

CORE PRINCIPLES

A. DEFINITION AND NATURE

Reyes' Commentary: Accomplices are persons who:

1. Are NOT principals under Article 17
2. Cooperate in the execution of the offense
3. Do so by previous or simultaneous acts

Boado's Commentary: The participation of an accomplice presupposes the commission of the crime by the principal. The principal element of complicity is the concurrence of the will of the accomplice with the will of the author of the crime (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 49).

B. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

Reyes' Commentary:

1. "Not being included in Article 17"

• An accomplice does NOT fall under any of the three concepts of principals
• His acts are neither:
  • Direct participation in execution
  • Inducement or force
  • Indispensable cooperation

2. Cooperation in Execution

• The accomplice cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts
• These acts aid in the execution but are not indispensable

3. Knowledge of Criminal Design

• The accomplice must know of the criminal purpose
• He agrees to cooperate in its accomplishment

C. DISTINGUISHING ACCOMPLICE FROM PRINCIPAL

1. Accomplice vs. Principal by Indispensable Cooperation

Test of Indispensability (Reyes):

Boado's Commentary (People vs. Ubina, 97 Phil. 515): If the accused does not fall under any of the three concepts in Article 17, he may only be considered an accomplice.

2. Accomplice vs. Conspirator

Reyes' Commentary (People vs. de Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999):

Key Distinction:

• Conspirators: Active participants in the decision-making process
• Accomplices: Passive cooperators who come in after the decision

D. QUASI-COLLECTIVE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Reyes' Commentary: Between collective and individual responsibility lies quasi-collective criminal responsibility, where:

• Some offenders are principals
• Others are accomplices
• Each receives different penalties based on degree of participation

E. RULE OF DOUBT

Reyes' Commentary (People vs. Clemente, G.R. No. L-23463, Sept. 28, 1967):

In case of doubt as to whether the offender should be classified as principal or accomplice, he should be given the benefit of doubt and considered an accomplice.

Example: While two brothers joined their sibling in pursuing and attacking the fallen victim, the eyewitness could not positively assert they managed to hit him. With no showing of conspiracy and uncertain extent of participation, they were declared mere accomplices.

F. PARTICIPATION MUST BE PROVEN

Reyes' Commentary (2 Viada, pp. 369-370): When the participation of an accused is not clearly disclosed, he should be considered only an accomplice, not a principal. The prosecution bears the burden of proving participation by positive and competent evidence—it cannot be presumed.

G. NO PREVIOUS AGREEMENT REQUIRED

Boado's Commentary (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571): An accomplice does not enter into conspiracy with the principal by direct participation. He does not have previous agreement or understanding to commit the crime. However, he participates to a certain point in the common criminal design.

Contrast with Conspiracy:

• In conspiracy, all are equally liable and receive the same penalty
• As accomplice, he receives penalty one degree lower (Art. 52)

H. EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION: CONSPIRATOR AS ACCOMPLICE

Reyes' Commentary (People vs. Nierra, 76 O.G. 6600): In exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.

Boado's Commentary (People vs. Anin, No. L-39046, June 30, 1975): If the overt acts of the accused, although done with knowledge of the criminal intent, were not indispensable to the assault, the accused should be held liable only as an accomplice, not as a principal.

Note: This is an exception to the general rule that conspirators are all principals.

ARTICLE 19: ACCESSORIES

CODAL PROVISION (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

CORE PRINCIPLES

A. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ACCESSORY

Reyes' Commentary:

1. Knowledge of Commission of Crime

• The accessory must have knowledge that a crime has been committed
• This knowledge must exist at the time he renders assistance

2. Non-Participation as Principal or Accomplice

• He must not have participated in the crime as principal or accomplice
• His involvement is purely post-facto

3. Participation Subsequent to Commission

• His acts must occur after the crime has been committed
• He assists in the aftermath, not the execution

4. Participation in One of Three Specified Manners

• Must fall under one of the three categories in Article 19

B. THREE CATEGORIES OF ACCESSORIES

1. Profiting from Effects of Crime (Par. 1)

Reyes' Commentary: This includes:

• Profiting themselves from the effects/proceeds of the crime
• Assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime

"Effects of the crime" = Proceeds, fruits, or instruments of the crime

Examples:

• Receiving stolen property knowing it was stolen
• Helping the principal sell stolen goods
• Sharing in the proceeds of robbery

Boado's Commentary: The accessory must have knowledge that the property represents the effects of a crime. Mere possession without such knowledge does not make one an accessory.

2. Concealing or Destroying Corpus Delicti (Par. 2)

Reyes' Commentary: This involves:

• Concealing the body of the crime
• Destroying the body of the crime
• Concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the crime
• Purpose: To prevent discovery

"Body of the crime" (corpus delicti) = The fact that the crime has been committed

Examples:

• Hiding a murder victim's corpse
• Destroying the weapon used in a killing
• Disposing of documentary evidence of falsification
• Burning stolen goods to prevent identification

Purpose Requirement: The concealment/destruction must be done "in order to prevent its discovery"—intent matters.

3. Harboring, Concealing, or Assisting Escape (Par. 3)

Reyes' Commentary: This applies to harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal, BUT ONLY IF:

Special Qualifying Conditions (Any ONE is sufficient):

a. Acts with Abuse of Public Functions

• The accessory is a public officer
• He uses/abuses his official position to harbor/conceal/assist escape

b. Crime is Treason, Parricide, Murder, or Attempt on Chief Executive

• The principal committed one of these specific grave crimes

c. Principal is Habitual Criminal

• The principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime

Boado's Commentary: Without any of these special conditions, merely harboring or assisting escape does not constitute being an accessory under paragraph 3.

Examples:

• A police officer who helps a murder suspect escape
• Hiding a parricide offender in one's home
• Providing transportation for a habitual thief to flee

C. PENALTY FOR ACCESSORIES

Campanilla's Commentary (Citing Art. 53 RPC): Accessories receive a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal in a consummated felony.

Application:

• Principal's penalty: Reclusion perpetua
• Accessory's penalty: Prision mayor (two degrees lower per Art. 71)

ARTICLE 20: ACCESSORIES EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY

CODAL PROVISION (REVISED PENAL CODE)

Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.

CORE PRINCIPLES

A. RATIONALE: TIES OF BLOOD AND AFFECTION

Reyes' Commentary: Article 20 recognizes that the ties of blood and affection make it unreasonable to expect a person to act against their close relatives. The law acknowledges the natural human impulse to protect family members.

Boado's Commentary: This exemption is an absolutory circumstance—while the act is criminal, the law exempts the actor from criminal liability due to the special relationship.

B. COVERED RELATIONSHIPS

Who is Exempt (when they act as accessories):

1. Spouse

• Legal husband or wife at the time of the accessory acts

2. Ascendants

• Parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.

3. Descendants

• Children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.

4. Brothers and Sisters

• Legitimate brothers and sisters
• Natural brothers and sisters (recognized natural children)
• Adopted brothers and sisters

5. Relatives by Affinity Within Same Degrees

• Relationship by marriage (in-laws)
• Within the same degrees as blood relatives above
• Examples: Parents-in-law, children-in-law, brothers/sisters-in-law

Reyes' Commentary: The enumeration of relatives is exclusive. Relationships not listed (e.g., uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, cousins) are not covered by the exemption.

C. EXCEPTION TO EXEMPTION: PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE 19

CRITICAL LIMITATION:

Article 20 does NOT apply to accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1—i.e., those who:

• Profit themselves from the effects of the crime, OR
• Assist the offender to profit from the effects of the crime

Why the Exception?

Reyes' Commentary: Profiting from crime involves material gain and affects property rights of third parties. Allowing exemption would:

• Encourage concealment of stolen property
• Harm victims' ability to recover property
• Create incentive for family members to benefit from crimes

Boado's Commentary: The exception reflects the policy that family ties should not shield one from liability when they actively enrich themselves or help the criminal profit from the crime. The exemption is based on natural impulse to protect, not on desire for gain.

D. SCOPE OF EXEMPTION

Exempt Relationships ARE Exempt For:

• ✓ Concealing or destroying corpus delicti (Art. 19, par. 2)
• ✓ Harboring, concealing, or assisting escape (Art. 19, par. 3)

Exempt Relationships are NOT Exempt For:

• ✗ Profiting from effects of crime (Art. 19, par. 1)
• ✗ Assisting offender to profit (Art. 19, par. 1)

E. ELEMENTS FOR EXEMPTION

Reyes' Commentary:

For Article 20 exemption to apply:

1. The person must be an accessory under Article 19, paragraphs 2 or 3

2. The accessory must be related to the principal offender within the specified degrees

3. The relationship must exist at the time the accessory acts

4. The acts must NOT involve profiting from effects of crime

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Example 1: Mother Hiding Son (EXEMPT)

• Son commits murder
• Mother hides him in her home
• Result: Mother is exempt under Art. 20 (paragraph 3 of Art. 19 + mother-son relationship)

Example 2: Wife Destroys Murder Weapon (EXEMPT)

• Husband commits murder
• Wife burns the weapon to prevent discovery
• Result: Wife is exempt under Art. 20 (paragraph 2 of Art. 19 + spousal relationship)

Example 3: Brother Receives Stolen Property (NOT EXEMPT)

• Brother commits theft
• Sister receives half the stolen jewelry
• Result: Sister is NOT exempt—falls under paragraph 1 (profiting from effects), which is excluded from Art. 20

Example 4: Father Helps Son Sell Robbery Proceeds (NOT EXEMPT)

• Son commits robbery
• Father helps sell the stolen items for profit
• Result: Father is NOT exempt—assisting offender to profit (Art. 19, par. 1) is excluded from Art. 20

Example 5: Uncle Hides Nephew (NOT EXEMPT)

• Nephew commits murder
• Uncle hides him
• Result: Uncle is NOT exempt—uncle-nephew relationship is NOT within the degrees specified in Art. 20

PENALTY TABLES AND APPLICATIONS

A. DIVISIBLE PENALTIES TABLE (FROM MATRIX)

B. GRADUATED SCALE OF PENALTIES (ARTICLE 71, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9346)

Campanilla's Commentary: Article 71 provides the graduated scale for computing penalties when reduced by degrees. Republic Act No. 9346 removed "death" from this scale.

Graduated Scale (Post-R.A. 9346):

1. Reclusion perpetua
2. Reclusion temporal
3. Prision mayor
4. Prision correccional
5. Arresto mayor
6. Destierro
7. Arresto menor
8. Public censure
9. Fine

C. PENALTY REDUCTION TABLE BY DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION

Based on Articles 50-57 RPC:

Campanilla's Commentary: Every penalty in the Revised Penal Code is understood as imposed upon the principal for a consummated felony (Art. 46). Articles 50-57 prescribe the rules for computing reduced penalties based on stage of execution and degree of participation.

D. PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF PENALTY COMPUTATION

Example 1: Murder (Post-R.A. 9346)

Base Penalty for Consummated Murder: Reclusion perpetua

Example 2: Qualified Rape (Post-R.A. 9346)

From People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401:

Base Penalty for Consummated Qualified Rape: Reclusion perpetua (after R.A. 9346)

Key Holding: R.A. 9346 removed "death" from Article 71, so attempted qualified rape is now punished with prision mayor (2 degrees lower than reclusion perpetua), not reclusion temporal.

E. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 63 (INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES)

Campanilla's Commentary: When the penalty is a single indivisible penalty (like reclusion perpetua), Article 63 governs its application:

Article 63 Rules:

1. With aggravating, no mitigating: Apply as prescribed
2. No aggravating, no mitigating: Apply as prescribed
3. Mitigating, no aggravating: Apply as prescribed (cannot reduce)
4. Both aggravating and mitigating: Apply as prescribed (offset each other)

Key Principle: Indivisible penalties are NOT subject to graduation by periods. They are applied in full regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances.

Case Application: People v. Amit, G.R. No. L-29066

Facts: Amit committed rape with homicide (penalty: death, later changed to RP). He had 2 mitigating circumstances (plea of guilty, voluntary surrender) and 2 aggravating circumstances (nighttime, abuse of superior strength).

Issue: Should mitigating circumstances reduce death to reclusion perpetua?

Ruling: No. Under Article 63(1), when the penalty is indivisible and there are aggravating circumstances, it must be applied regardless of mitigating circumstances.

Boado's Commentary: This demonstrates that indivisible penalties have unique rules—they cannot be reduced by periods like divisible penalties can under Article 64.

Case Application: People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 136398

Facts: Ramos convicted of rape (penalty: reclusion perpetua). He had 2 mitigating circumstances (intoxication, voluntary surrender), no aggravating circumstances. RTC applied Indeterminate Sentence Law and imposed 12 years prision mayor (minimum) to 17 years reclusion temporal (maximum).

Issue: Does ISL apply to reduce reclusion perpetua?

Ruling: No. Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty that must be applied regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances. ISL does not apply to indivisible penalties because they admit of no gradation.

COMPREHENSIVE CASE DIGEST

CASE 1: PEOPLE v. ALFREDO BON (G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006)

DOCTRINE: R.A. 9346 statutorily abolished the death penalty and removed "death" from Article 71's graduated scale, requiring corresponding reduction of all penalties computed from death.

FACTS:

• Bon convicted of 6 counts consummated qualified rape and 2 counts attempted rape against nieces
• RTC sentenced to death; CA downgraded 2 counts to attempted rape
• CA computed attempted rape as 2 degrees lower than death = reclusion temporal
• Issue: Effect of R.A. 9346 on penalties graduated from death

ISSUES & HOLDINGS:

Issue 1: Whether R.A. 9346 modified penalties other than death?

• YES. R.A. 9346 effects statutory abolition (not mere prohibition like 1987 Constitution)
• Expressly repeals all laws imposing death penalty
• Must read Article 71 without "death" in graduated scale

Issue 2: What is the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape?

• Prision mayor (2 degrees lower than reclusion perpetua per Art. 51)
• ISL applies: Max within prision mayor; min within prision correccional

RATIO DECIDENDI: Retaining "death" in Article 71 creates absurd results:

1. Principals and accomplices receive same penalty (both RP)—violates Art. 52
2. Frustrated and consummated felonies have identical penalties—violates Art. 50
3. Attempted only one degree lower than consummated—violates Art. 51

Principles:

• Interpretare et concordare: Harmonize statutes into coherent system
• Pro reo: Penal laws construed liberally in favor of accused
• Art. 22 retroactivity: Favorable penal laws apply retroactively

PENALTY COMPUTATION TEACHING:

DISPOSITION:

• 6 counts consummated: Reclusion perpetua without parole
• 2 counts attempted: 2 years, 4 months, 1 day prision correccional (min) to 8 years, 1 day prision mayor (max)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Demonstrates how Articles 50-57 (penalty graduation by participation) require proper Article 71 scale. Without removing death, accomplices/accessories would not receive properly graduated penalties.

CASE 2: PEOPLE v. MARCELO AMIT (G.R. No. L-29066, March 25, 1970)

DOCTRINE: When the penalty prescribed is a single indivisible penalty, it must be applied regardless of mitigating circumstances if there is an aggravating circumstance (Art. 63[1]).

FACTS:

• Amit convicted of rape with homicide (penalty: death)
• Mitigating: Plea of guilty, voluntary surrender
• Aggravating: Nighttime, abuse of superior strength
• Defense claimed mitigating circumstances should reduce to reclusion perpetua

ISSUE: Whether mitigating circumstances reduce indivisible penalty when aggravating circumstances present?

RULING: NO. Article 63(1) mandates that indivisible penalties apply regardless of mitigating circumstances when aggravating circumstances are present.

ARTICLE 63 APPLICATION:

When penalty is single indivisible (death or RP):

1. AG present, no MT: Apply as prescribed
2. No AG, no MT: Apply as prescribed
3. MT present, no AG: Apply as prescribed (cannot reduce!)
4. Both AG and MT: Apply as prescribed (offset)

Key: Indivisible penalties do NOT admit of graduation by periods.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE ANALYSIS:

Lack of Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong (Art. 13[3]):

• REJECTED in Amit
• Must show great disproportion between means and consequences
• Amit's acts (boxing + choking while on top of victim) were reasonably sufficient to produce death
• Cannot be appreciated when accused used brute force

Voluntary Surrender: Accepted Plea of Guilty: Accepted But: Both insufficient to overcome aggravating circumstances under Art. 63(1)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Shows that even principals (Art. 17) cannot escape proper penalty through mitigating circumstances alone when law prescribes indivisible penalty with aggravating circumstances.

CASE 3: PEOPLE v. LITO BEJIC (G.R. No. 174060, June 25, 2007)

DOCTRINE: When incestuous rape information fails to allege offender's knowledge of victim's relationship/minority, only simple rape (not qualified rape) can be proven.

FACTS:

• Bejic (father) raped 14-year-old daughter AAA
• Information alleged victim was "14-year-old mentally retarded person"
• Did NOT allege father-daughter relationship as qualifying circumstance
• RTC convicted of qualified rape, sentenced to death
• R.A. 9346 took effect during appeal

ISSUES & HOLDINGS:

Issue 1: Whether victim's testimony credible despite mental retardation?

• YES. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility
• Mental retardate can be credible witness if able to perceive and communicate

Issue 2: Whether death penalty still imposable under R.A. 9346?

• NO. Penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua without parole
• R.A. 9346 prohibits death penalty imposition

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES RULE: Must be:

1. Alleged specifically in Information
2. Proved beyond reasonable doubt

Failure to allege = cannot appreciate as qualifying circumstance

PENALTY: Reclusion perpetua (simple rape under Art. 266-A)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Demonstrates importance of proper charging—even principals (Art. 17) receive different penalties based on what qualifying circumstances are properly alleged and proved.

CASE 4: PEOPLE v. LOUIE RAMOS (G.R. No. 136398, November 23, 2000)

DOCTRINE: The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty that admits of no gradation.

FACTS:

• Ramos raped unconscious victim
• Mitigating: Intoxication, voluntary surrender (no aggravating)
• RTC applied ISL: 12 years prision mayor (min) to 17 years reclusion temporal (max)
• CA: Increased to reclusion perpetua

ISSUE: Whether ISL applies to reduce reclusion perpetua when mitigating circumstances present?

RULING: NO. Reclusion perpetua is single indivisible penalty—must be applied regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances per Article 63.

ARTICLE 63 TEACHING:

• Even with 2 mitigating, 0 aggravating, indivisible penalty applies in full
• Mitigating circumstances cannot reduce indivisible penalties
• ISL requires penalty with periods/gradations—not applicable to RP

RAPE OF UNCONSCIOUS PERSON:

• Victim was asleep/unconscious when rape commenced
• Resistance upon waking does not negate rape already in progress
• Force/intimidation not required when victim unconscious (Art. 335, par. 2)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Principals receive full indivisible penalty—but accomplices would receive reclusion temporal (one degree lower, which IS divisible and subject to ISL).

CASE 5: PEOPLE v. JERRY OBOGNE (G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014)

DOCTRINE: Under Art. 266-B(10), the offender's knowledge of victim's mental disability is a qualifying circumstance that must be specifically alleged in the Information and proved beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

• Obogne raped 12-year-old mentally retarded victim
• Information: Alleged victim was "mentally retarded" but did NOT allege accused knew of the disability
• Issue: Simple rape or qualified rape?

RULING: Simple rape only. Qualifying circumstance of knowledge not properly alleged.

ART. 266-B(10) REQUIREMENTS: For death/RP without parole (before/after R.A. 9346):

1. Victim has mental disability
2. Offender knew of such disability at time of rape
3. Both elements must be alleged AND proved

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE DOCTRINE:

• Must be formally alleged with specificity in Information
• Must be duly proved beyond reasonable doubt
• Cannot be appreciated if not properly alleged, even if proved

PENALTY:

• Simple rape: Reclusion perpetua (Art. 266-B, par. 1)
• Qualified rape (if properly alleged): Reclusion perpetua without parole (Art. 266-B, par. 10 + R.A. 9346)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Shows how qualifying circumstances affect principal's penalty—and consequently, penalties for accomplices (Art. 18) and accessories (Art. 19) computed therefrom.

CASE 6: PEOPLE v. CONRADO LUCAS (G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994)

DOCTRINE: Variance Doctrine - accused cannot be convicted of consummated crime when charged only with attempted crime; victim must prove what information charges

FACTS:

• Lucas charged with rape (Nov. 26, 1982) and attempted rape (Feb. 12, 1991) against daughter Chanda
• Evidence showed actual incident was Nov. 26, 1983 (variance from complaint)
• In attempted rape case, prosecution proved consummated rape (penetration)
• Lucas indicated "single" in second marriage contract, concealing first marriage

ISSUES & HOLDINGS:

Issue 1: Can accused be convicted of consummated rape when charged only with attempted rape?

• NO. Under Section 4, Rule 120 (Variance Doctrine), accused convicted only of offense charged or lesser included offense
• Attempted rape is NOT a lesser included offense of consummated rape—it's part of the same continuum
• Convicted only of attempted rape despite proof of consummation

Issue 2: Did R.A. 7659 convert reclusion perpetua into divisible penalty?

• INITIALLY YES (May 1994): First Division held RP became divisible, applied Art. 65
• LATER REVERSED (January 1995 EN BANC Resolution - see Case 7)

PENALTY COMPUTATION (May 1994 Decision):

Statutory Rape (Crim. Case 18465):

• RTC: Reclusion perpetua
• First Division: Applied Art. 65 to divide RP into three periods
• With aggravating circumstance (relationship): 34 years, 4 months, 1 day RP

Attempted Rape (Crim. Case 18466):

• Consummated rape: Reclusion perpetua (RP)
• Attempted: 2 degrees lower = Prision mayor
• With mitigating (voluntary surrender): Minimum period of PM
• ISL: 4 years, 2 months, 1 day prision correccional (min) to 10 years, 1 day prision mayor (max)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Demonstrates variance doctrine protection for accused—even principals (Art. 17) cannot be convicted beyond what's charged in Information

CASE 7: PEOPLE v. CONRADO LUCAS (G.R. Nos. 108172-73, January 9, 1995 - EN BANC RESOLUTION)

DOCTRINE: Reclusion perpetua REMAINS AN INDIVISIBLE PENALTY despite R.A. 7659 fixing its duration at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years; no clear legislative intent to alter classification

FACTS:

• EN BANC reviewed First Division's May 1994 decision (Case 6)
• Issue: Did R.A. 7659, Sec. 21 (fixing RP duration at 20y1d-40y) make RP divisible?
• First Division had applied Art. 65 to divide RP into periods

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 7659 converted RP from indivisible to divisible penalty?

RULING: NO. Reclusion perpetua REMAINS INDIVISIBLE.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ANALYSIS:

Senate Bill 891 (Original):

• Did NOT seek death penalty
• Proposed RP only for heinous crimes
• Required 30 years actual service
• No mention of making RP divisible

House Bill 62:

• Sought to reimpose death penalty
• Became final version after consolidation

Final R.A. 7659:

• Fixed RP duration but gave no clear indication of intent to make it divisible
• Silence on converting to divisible penalty

COMPARATIVE TABLE: MAY 1994 vs. JANUARY 1995

RATIO DECIDENDI:

1. No Clear Legislative Intent: Mere fixing of duration does not automatically convert penalty to divisible status

2. Preserves Article 63: If RP divisible, Art. 63 (rules for indivisible penalties) loses purpose

3. Avoids Absurd Results:

• Would make reclusion temporal redundant
• Would create penalty gaps

4. Statutory Construction: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - law specified making reclusion temporal divisible but silent on RP

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Critical for penalty computation. Principals receiving RP cannot have it reduced by mitigating circumstances. Accomplices receive reclusion temporal (one degree lower), which IS divisible.

CASE 8: PEOPLE v. RODEL LANUZA (G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011)

DOCTRINE: Accident (Art. 12[4]) requires proof of "due care"; failure to exercise care expected of a trained person negates exemption

FACTS:

• Lanuza (security guard, 3 years experience) shot Butay during shift change
• Defense: Gun accidentally fired when handed over
• Prosecution: Lanuza deliberately shot Butay, tried second shot (click only)
• Medical: Gunshot wound requiring 12-day confinement
• Convicted: Frustrated homicide

ISSUE: Whether shooting was accident (Art. 12[4]) or frustrated homicide?

RULING: Frustrated homicide. Accident NOT proven.

ARTICLE 12(4) ELEMENTS:

1. Performing lawful act
2. With due care
3. Causes injury by mere accident
4. Without fault or intention

WHY ACCIDENT FAILED:

A. No Due Care:

• Lanuza had 3 years training as security guard
• Knew it was improper to:
  • Receive firearm with finger in trigger guard
  • Handle firearm with barrel pointed at person
• Yet admitted doing exactly these improper acts
• "No one can be a security guard and receive firearm by immediately inserting trigger finger inside trigger guard"

B. Post-Shooting Conduct:

• Did nothing for 10 seconds
• Made no attempt to help wounded victim
• "Had it really been accidental, natural tendency would be to immediately give help"

C. Intent to Kill Proven:

• Nature and location of wound (vital organ—spleen)
• Weapon used (shotgun)
• Victim's testimony of second attempted shot
• Severity of injuries requiring surgery

PENALTY COMPUTATION:

Frustrated Homicide:

• Consummated homicide: Reclusion temporal (Art. 249)
• Frustrated: One degree lower = Prision mayor (Art. 50)
• Mitigating: Voluntary surrender
• No aggravating circumstances

Applying ISL:

Maximum Term: Prision mayor in minimum period (6y1d-8y)

• With mitigating, no aggravating: minimum period per Art. 64(2)
• Maximum: 7 years prision mayor

Minimum Term: Penalty next lower (prision correccional)

• Minimum: 4 years prision correccional

Final Sentence: 4 years prision correccional (min) to 7 years prision mayor (max)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Shows burden on principal (Art. 17) to prove exempting circumstances. Intent to kill determined by (1) means employed, (2) nature/location/number of wounds, (3) conduct before/during/after attack.

CASE 9: VIRGILIO TALAMPAS v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011)

DOCTRINE: Aberratio ictus (mistake in blow) - accused liable for all consequences of criminal act even if victim different from intended (Art. 4)

FACTS:

• Talampas shot at Eduardo Matic (intended target)
• Eduardo hid behind brother Ernesto
• Talampas fired 3 more times: killed Ernesto, wounded Eduardo
• Defense: Accident during struggle for gun

ISSUES & HOLDINGS:

Issue 1: Self-defense against Ernesto?

• NO. Wrong protagonists—Ernesto never attacked Talampas
• Unlawful aggression must come from victim
• Talampas targeted Eduardo, not Ernesto

Issue 2: Accident?

• NO. Elements of Art. 12(4) not proven
• Initial attack was unlawful (shooting Eduardo)
• Cannot claim accident in furtherance of unlawful act

Issue 3: Criminal liability despite wrong victim (aberratio ictus)?

• YES. Under Art. 4, par. 1: "Criminal liability incurred by any person committing a felony although wrongful act done be different from that intended"
• Doctrine of transferred intent

Issue 4: Correct indeterminate sentence?

• YES, with minor correction (add 1 day to maximum)

PENALTY COMPUTATION:

Homicide:

• Base penalty: Reclusion temporal (Art. 249)
• Mitigating: Voluntary surrender
• No aggravating

Applying ISL:

Maximum Term: Reclusion temporal in minimum period

• Minimum period: 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months
• RTC imposed: 14 years 8 months ✓
• SC corrected to: 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day (to be within minimum period)

Minimum Term: Penalty next lower (prision mayor)

• RTC imposed: 10 years and 1 day prision mayor ✓

Final: 10 years, 1 day prision mayor (min) to 14 years, 8 months, 1 day reclusion temporal (max)

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Art. 4 applies to all principals (Art. 17)—liable for all natural and logical consequences even if victim different from intended or injury graver than intended.

CASE 10: PEOPLE v. BETH TEMPORADA (G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 - EN BANC)

DOCTRINE: THE TEMPORADA FORMULA - Establishes definitive method for computing indeterminate sentences for estafa exceeding ₱22,000 under Art. 315, par. 2(a) RPC

FACTS:

• Temporada convicted of illegal recruitment and 5 counts estafa
• Amounts: ₱57,600; ₱66,520; ₱69,520; ₱69,520; ₱88,520
• Issue: Proper penalty computation for estafa exceeding ₱22,000

RULING: EN BANC establishes step-by-step formula

THE TEMPORADA FORMULA (ESTAFA > ₱22,000):

STEP 1: Determine MINIMUM Term

• From penalty next lower to prescribed penalty
• Prescribed: PC max to PM min (4y2mo1d to 8y)
• Next lower: PC min and med (6mo1d to 4y2mo)
• Court discretion within this range
• DO NOT consider excess over ₱22,000 yet

STEP 2: Determine Prescribed Penalty's Three Periods

• Prescribed: PC max to PM min (4y2mo1d to 8y)
• Divide into thirds per Art. 65:
  • Minimum period: 4y2mo1d to 5y5mo10d
  • Medium period: 5y5mo11d to 6y8mo20d
  • Maximum period: 6y8mo21d to 8y

STEP 3: Compute Incremental Penalty

• Formula: (Amount - ₱22,000) ÷ ₱10,000
• DISCARD fractions (pro reo)
• Example: ₱57,600 - ₱22,000 = ₱35,600 ÷ ₱10,000 = 3.56 = 3 years

STEP 4: Determine MAXIMUM Term

• Start from maximum period (6y8mo21d to 8y)
• ADD incremental penalty
• Example: 6y8mo21d + 3y = 9y8mo21d minimum maximum
• Cannot exceed 20 years

APPLICATION TO TEMPORADA'S CASES:

KEY DOCTRINES:

1. Gabres Affirmed: Incremental penalty analogous to modifying circumstance

2. Minimum "Stagnates": Always from PC min-med regardless of amount

3. Discard Fractions: Favorable to accused

4. Lowest Maximum: Always start from 6y8mo21d + increment

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Complex penalty computation affecting principals. Accomplices would receive minimum one degree lower (arresto mayor to PC min-med); maximum from next lower prescribed penalty.

CASE 11: IN RE LAGRAN (G.R. No. 147270, August 15, 2001)

DOCTRINE: Multiple prison terms involving deprivation of liberty must be served SUCCESSIVELY, not simultaneously, under Article 70 RPC

FACTS:

• Lagran convicted of 3 counts BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
• Sentenced: 1 year imprisonment per count + fine
• Served 2 years, claimed completion (arguing simultaneous service)
• Filed habeas corpus

ISSUE: Can three 1-year prison terms be served simultaneously?

RULING: NO. Must be served SUCCESSIVELY.

ARTICLE 70 RULES:

General Rule: Penalties served simultaneously if nature permits; otherwise successively

Penalties Served SIMULTANEOUSLY:

• Perpetual/temporary disqualifications
• Suspension
• Destierro
• Public censure
• Fine
• Civil interdiction
• Confiscation
• Note: All (except destierro) can be served simultaneously WITH imprisonment

Penalties Served SUCCESSIVELY:

• All penalties involving deprivation of liberty (imprisonment)
• Reclusion perpetua
• Reclusion temporal
• Prision mayor
• Prision correccional
• Arresto mayor
• Arresto menor

RATIONALE: Physically impossible to serve multiple prison terms simultaneously—one cannot be in two places at once

ORDER OF SEVERITY (Successive Service):

1. Death (now prohibited)
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correccional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Arresto menor 8-12. [Non-deprivation penalties as listed above]

THREE-FOLD RULE (Art. 70):

• Maximum service: 3x most severe penalty
• Absolute maximum: 40 years
• Perpetual penalties computed at: 30 years
• Applies to service, not imposition

APPLICATION TO LAGRAN:

• 3 counts x 1 year = 3 years total (successive)
• Served only 2 years = INCOMPLETE
• Habeas corpus DENIED

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Art. 70 applies to all convicted persons regardless of degree of participation. Principals, accomplices, and accessories all subject to successive service rule for multiple prison terms.

CASE 12: SERMONIA v. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994)

DOCTRINE: Constructive notice rule does NOT apply to bigamy; prescription begins from actual discovery by offended party, not from registration of bigamous marriage

FACTS:

• Sermonia married Virginia (first marriage)
• Later married Ma. Lourdes on Feb. 15, 1975 (bigamous marriage)
• Second marriage registered 1975
• Information filed 1992 (17 years after)
• Defense: Prescribed—registration = constructive notice (1975)

ISSUE: When does prescription of bigamy begin—registration or discovery?

RULING: Prescription begins from ACTUAL DISCOVERY, not registration.

ARTICLE 90 RPC (Prescription):

• Afflictive penalties (including prision mayor for bigamy): 15 years
• Begins to run from date of discovery by offended party/authorities

WHY CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE DOES NOT APPLY:

1. Bigamy Entered Into in Secrecy:

• Offender conceals from first spouse
• Committed where offender not known as married
• Inherently secretive nature

2. Marriage Not Like Property:

• Unlike land (Register of Deeds easily checked)
• Marriage can be entered anywhere in Philippines
• No practical way to search nationwide

3. No Legal Basis:

• PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides constructive notice for land
• Act 3753 (Civil Register) has NO counterpart provision
• Civil Code Arts. 407-413 silent on constructive notice

4. Concealment Inherent:

• Here, Sermonia indicated "single" in marriage contract
• Concealed true status from priest/officials
• Did not tell first wife

5. Policy Considerations:

• Computing from registration = almost absolute impunity
• Would make prosecution nearly impossible
• Encourage violations of marriage institution

PRESCRIPTION COMPUTATION:

• Discovery: July 1991
• Filing: May 26, 1992
• Elapsed: ~11 months
• Within 15-year period ✓
• NOT prescribed

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Art. 90 (prescription) applies to all criminally liable persons. Timing of prescription important for principals (Art. 17) who commit crime. Discovery rule protects victims while ensuring prosecution not indefinitely delayed.

CASE 13: REPUBLIC v. DESIERTO (G.R. No. 136506, August 23, 2001)

DOCTRINE: Prescription of crimes under special laws begins from discovery when commission is concealed through conspiracy, not from date of commission

FACTS:

• Cojuangco and others entered one-sided MOA (Nov. 20, 1974) prejudicial to CIDF
• Concealed through conspiracy and positions of authority
• EDSA Revolution 1986 exposed anomalies
• Complaint filed Feb. 12, 1990
• Ombudsman dismissed: Prescribed (reckoned from 1974 = >10 years)

ISSUE: When does prescription begin—commission (1974) or discovery (1986/1990)?

RULING: Prescription begins from DISCOVERY for concealed crimes.

ACT NO. 3326 (Prescription of Offenses Under Special Laws):

• Violations of special laws not punishable by RPC
• Includes RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law)

PRESCRIPTION PERIODS (RA 3019, Sec. 11):

• Before March 16, 1982: 10 years
• After March 16, 1982: 15 years

DISCOVERY RULE APPLICATION:

When Discovery Rule Applies:

• Crime concealed by its very nature
• Concealment through conspiracy
• Offender in position of authority
• Victim unable to reasonably discover

Why Discovery Rule Here:

1. Conspiracy: Multiple high officials concealed transactions
2. Positions: Cojuangco (influential), Enrile (minister), bank directors
3. Complex transactions: One-sided contract hidden in technical provisions
4. Government funds: CIDF misuse not immediately apparent
5. EDSA Revolution: Only then could anomalies be investigated

PRESCRIPTION COMPUTATION:

• Offenses committed: 1974-1983
• Discovery: 1986 (EDSA) or 1990 (complaint filed)
• If from 1986: Still within 15 years when filed 1990
• If from 1990: Just filed = 0 years
• NOT prescribed ✓

CONTRASTED WITH SERMONIA:

• Both use discovery rule
• Sermonia: Inherently secretive crime (bigamy)
• Desierto: Concealed through conspiracy

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Discovery rule critical for co-conspirators who are all principals (Art. 17) when conspiracy proven. Conspiracy both makes all liable AND triggers discovery rule for prescription.

CASE 14: ROMUALDEZ v. MARCELO (G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006)

DOCTRINE: Absence from Philippines does NOT toll prescription under Act 3326 governing special laws; Art. 91 RPC inapplicable absent express provision

FACTS:

• "Kokoy" Romualdez charged with violating RA 3019 (failure to file SALs)
• Absent from Philippines 1986-April 2000 (14 years)
• Complaint filed May 8, 1987
• New informations filed 2004
• Defense: Prescribed

ISSUE: Does absence from Philippines toll/suspend prescription under Act 3326?

RULING: NO. Absence does NOT toll prescription.

ACT NO. 3326, SECTION 2: "Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."

KEY HOLDINGS:

1. Act 3326 Governs Special Laws:

• RA 3019 is special law
• Prescription governed by Act 3326, NOT Art. 90-92 RPC
• RPC provisions suppletory only per Art. 10

2. Article 10 RPC (Suppletory Application): "This Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary"

• Act 3326 specially provides prescription rules
• Art. 91 RPC (absence tolls prescription) therefore NOT applicable

3. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius:

• Act 3326, Sec. 2 lists specific circumstances interrupting prescription:
  • Institution of proceedings
  • Not: Absence from Philippines
• Enumeration is exclusive—what is not included is excluded

4. Legislative Intent:

• If lawmakers intended absence to toll prescription, they would have so stated
• Silence = deliberate exclusion

CONTRASTED WITH RPC CRIMES:

PRESCRIPTION COMPUTATION:

• Offenses: 1963-1985 (various years)
• 10-year/15-year periods applicable
• Absence 1986-2000: Does not suspend time
• Most offenses PRESCRIBED ✓
• Informations filed 2004: Too late

DISPOSITION: Motion for Reconsideration GRANTED. All cases DISMISSED for prescription.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Important for principals (Art. 17) charged under special laws. Unlike RPC crimes where absence tolls prescription, special laws follow stricter rule unless expressly stated otherwise.

CASE 15: CRUZ v. GO (G.R. No. 223446, November 28, 2016)

DOCTRINE: Director of Prisons has statutory authority under Arts. 97 & 99 RPC to grant GCTA (partial commutation), distinct from President's constitutional power of executive clemency

FACTS:

• Go convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua
• Began serving April 30, 1996
• Granted colonist status July 30, 2008
• Claimed sentence expired Aug. 21, 2013 after GCTA + 30-year reduction
• RTC granted habeas corpus; BuCor Director appealed

ISSUE: Can BuCor Director commute RP to 30 years through GCTA, or only President can commute?

RULING: YES, BuCor Director has statutory authority.

TWO TYPES OF COMMUTATION:

1. Presidential Power (Full Commutation):

• Art. VII, Sec. 19, Constitution
• Executive clemency: commutation, pardon, reprieve
• Requires presidential action

2. Statutory Reduction (Partial Commutation):

• Arts. 70, 97, 99 RPC
• Through good conduct time allowances
• Director of Prisons authority
• NOT executive clemency—statutory entitlement

ARTICLE 70 RPC: "Duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at 30 years" for:

• Three-fold rule application
• Successive service
• GCTA computation
• Pardon eligibility

ARTICLE 97 RPC (GCTA):

• Years 1-2: 5 days/month
• Years 3-5: 8 days/month
• Years 6-10: 10 days/month
• Year 11+: 15 days/month
• "Shall entitle"—mandatory if qualified

ARTICLE 99 RPC: "Whenever lawfully justified, Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked."

KEY HOLDINGS:

1. Statutory vs. Executive Clemency:

• GCTA is statutory right, not clemency
• Mandatory ("shall grant") when conditions met
• Vested right—cannot be revoked

2. Director's Authority Clear:

• Art. 99 unambiguous
• Grants Director exclusive authority
• Provincial wardens cannot usurp

3. Two Powers Not Mutually Exclusive:

• Presidential clemency: Full commutation/pardon
• Statutory reduction: Partial through GCTA
• Both can coexist—different purposes

4. Avoid Surplusage:

• Reading Art. 99 to require presidential approval = make it meaningless
• Every provision must have effect

GO'S COMPUTATION:

1. Base: 30 years (Art. 70)
2. GCTA: Regular deductions per Art. 97
3. Colonist bonus: Additional 5 days/month + 30-year cap
4. Preventive imprisonment: 9 months 16 days credit
5. Total: Completed sentence Aug. 21, 2013

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. Order Go's immediate release. Resolution IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: All principals (Art. 17) serving sentences eligible for GCTA. Art. 99 provides statutory mechanism for reducing penalties without presidential intervention—important for penalty administration.

CASE 16: PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS (G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994 - EN BANC)

DOCTRINE: Death of accused pending appeal (before final judgment) extinguishes BOTH criminal liability AND civil liability ex delicto; reverses Sendaydiego doctrine

FACTS:

• Bayotas convicted of rape by RTC June 19, 1991
• Appealed to Supreme Court
• Died February 4, 1992 during pendency of appeal
• Issue: Does death extinguish civil liability too?

ISSUE: Does death pending appeal extinguish civil liability ex delicto?

RULING: YES. Both criminal and civil liability extinguished.

ARTICLE 89(1) RPC: "Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment."

INTERPRETATION OF "FINAL JUDGMENT":

Spanish Origin: "Sentencia firme"

• Judgment that acquires definitive force
• Because parties have not appealed within legal period
• Means: Final and executory, not merely trial court judgment

Application:

• Bayotas died while appeal pending
• Judgment NOT yet final and executory
• Therefore: Both criminal and civil liability EXTINGUISHED

KEY DOCTRINAL POINTS:

1. Civil Liability Ex Delicto is Dependent:

Article 100 RPC: "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"

• Civil liability ex delicto requires finding of criminal liability
• Cannot exist independently of final criminal judgment
• If no final judgment (due to death), no basis for civil liability

2. Sendaydiego Doctrine OVERRULED:

Sendaydiego had held civil liability survives by treating it as separate civil action under Art. 30, Civil Code.

Why Sendaydiego Wrong:

A. Misapplication of Art. 30, Civil Code: Art. 30 provides: "When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during pendency of civil case, preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient"

• Art. 30 contemplates alternative separate civil action
• Does NOT authorize converting impliedly instituted civil action into independent one
• Civil action in Bayotas was NOT filed separately—impliedly instituted with criminal

B. Misapplication of Section 21, Rule 3: Sec. 21, Rule 3 (substitution of parties upon death) applies to ordinary civil actions for money claims, NOT civil liability ex delicto

C. Section 5, Rule 86 Limitation: Claims against estate limited to:

• Funeral expenses
• Last sickness
• Judgments for money
• Claims arising from contracts (express/implied)

Civil liability ex delicto arises from delict/tort, NOT contract—outside enumeration

3. Mors Omnia Solvit: Latin maxim: "Death dissolves all things"

• Death before final judgment dissolves all criminal proceedings
• Includes dependent civil liability

CONTRASTED SITUATIONS:

DISPOSITION: Appeal DISMISSED without qualification. Both liabilities extinguished.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTS. 16-20: Applies to all persons criminally liable—principals (Art. 17), accomplices (Art. 18), accessories (Art. 19). Death pending appeal extinguishes liability regardless of degree of participation. Only survivors if death after final judgment can civil liability be claimed from estate.

COMMENTARY SUMMARY

A. BOADO'S COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS

On Conspiracy (Arts. 16-17):

• Conspiracy requires same quantum of proof as the crime itself
• Must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, not merely surmised
• Can be deduced from acts before, during, and after crime
• When conspiracy exists, all are principals by direct participation
• Act of one is act of all; extent of individual participation becomes secondary

On Principals by Induction (Art. 17):

• Requires most positive resolution and persistent effort
• Inducement must be determining cause of the crime
• Moral influence of words varies based on relationship (father's words vs. stranger's)
• Cannot be guilty without showing crime was actually committed by another

On Accomplices (Art. 18):

• Do not have previous agreement with principals (unlike conspirators)
• Participate to certain point in criminal design but not indispensably
• Receive penalty one degree lower than principal

On Suppletory Application (Art. 10):

• Articles 16-18 apply suppletorily to special laws
• Examples: B.P. 22, Act 1740 (misappropriation), Opium Law
• Unless special law provides otherwise

On Light Felonies (Art. 16):

• Accessories not liable—penalty would be non-existent
• De minimis non curat lex (law does not deal with trifles)

B. REYES' COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS

On Principals by Indispensable Cooperation (Art. 17):

• Must show: (1) participation in criminal resolution, (2) cooperation by another act, (3) such act indispensable
• Differs from accomplice: indispensability is key test
• Has collective criminal responsibility with principal by direct participation

On Individual vs. Collective Responsibility:

• Without conspiracy: each liable only for own acts
• Example: Three people attacked by deceased—only one inflicted fatal wound—individual responsibility applies
• Killer liable for homicide; others only for physical injuries actually inflicted

On Accomplice vs. Conspirator:

• Conspirators decide crime should be committed; accomplices merely assent
• Conspirators are authors; accomplices are instruments
• Conspirators know criminal intent because they decided it; accomplices learn afterward

On Rule of Doubt (Art. 18):

• When in doubt between principal and accomplice, classify as accomplice
• Participation must be proven by positive and competent evidence
• Cannot be presumed

On Accessories (Art. 19):

• Must have knowledge of crime at time of assistance
• Acts must be subsequent to commission
• Three categories with specific requirements
• Paragraph 3 requires special qualifying conditions

On Article 20 Exemption:

• Based on ties of blood and affection
• Exception for profiting (Art. 19, par. 1) reflects policy against enrichment from crime
• Enumeration of relatives is exclusive

C. CAMPANILLA'S COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS

On Penalty Graduation (Arts. 50-57, 61, 71):

• Every penalty in RPC understood as imposed on principal for consummated felony (Art. 46)
• Articles 50-57 prescribe reductions for frustrated, attempted, accomplices, accessories
• Article 61 provides rules for graduating using Article 71 scale
• Article 64 provides rules for divisible penalties
• Article 63 provides rules for indivisible penalties

On Divisible Penalties (Art. 64):

• Can be divided into three periods: minimum, medium, maximum
• Application depends on modifying circumstances:
  • No circumstances: medium period
  • Only mitigating: minimum period
  • Only aggravating: maximum period
  • Special mitigating (2+ mitigating): reduce by one degree

On Indivisible Penalties (Art. 63):

• Death, reclusion perpetua
• Applied regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances (with limited exceptions)
• No periods to graduate
• Cannot be reduced by mitigating circumstances alone

On R.A. 9346 Effect:

• Removed death from Article 71 graduated scale
• All penalties computed from death must be recalculated
• Principals, accomplices, accessories all affected
• Maintains proper penalty gradations

PRACTICE PROBLEMS

Problem 1: Determining Degree of Participation

Facts: A, B, and C planned to rob a house. A acted as lookout. B disabled the alarm system. C entered and took jewelry. As they fled, the homeowner confronted them. C shot and killed the homeowner.

Questions:

1. What is each person's degree of participation in the robbery?
2. What is each person's degree of participation in the homicide?
3. How do penalties differ for each?

Analysis:

• Robbery: All three are principals by direct participation (conspiracy)
• Homicide: If homicide was within scope of conspiracy, all principals; if not, only C is principal, A and B may be accessories if they helped escape with knowledge
• Penalties: Depends on whether complex crime (Art. 48) or separate crimes

Problem 2: Accomplice vs. Principal

Facts: X decided to kill V. X asked Y to lend him a gun. Y, knowing X's plan, lent the gun. Y did not participate further. X used the gun to kill V.

Question: Is Y a principal by indispensable cooperation or an accomplice?

Analysis:

• Test: Could X have accomplished the crime without Y's gun?
• If yes (X could get gun elsewhere): Y is accomplice
• If no (gun was indispensable): Y is principal by indispensable cooperation
• More likely accomplice—lending gun aids but is not indispensable; X could obtain weapon elsewhere

Problem 3: Accessory Exemption

Facts: Father commits theft of expensive jewelry worth ₱1,000,000. Son, knowing of the theft:

• Scenario A: Helps father hide the jewelry
• Scenario B: Receives half the jewelry for himself

Question: Is son exempt from liability in each scenario?

Analysis:

• Scenario A: Son is exempt under Art. 20 (concealing effects of crime + son-father relationship)
• Scenario B: Son is NOT exempt—exception applies for Art. 19, par. 1 (profiting from effects)

Problem 4: Penalty Computation After R.A. 9346

Facts: D is convicted as accomplice to consummated murder.

Question: What is D's penalty?

Analysis:

• Murder: Reclusion perpetua (principal, consummated, post-R.A. 9346)
• Accomplice: One degree lower (Art. 52)
• Penalty: Reclusion temporal
• Periods: Minimum (12y, 1d - 14y, 8m), Medium (14y, 8m - 17y, 4m), Maximum (17y, 4m - 20y)
• Apply Art. 64 based on mitigating/aggravating circumstances

Problem 5: Indivisible Penalty Application

Facts: E commits simple rape. Present: 2 mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender, plea of guilty), 0 aggravating.

Question: What is E's penalty?

Analysis:

• Simple rape: Reclusion perpetua (single indivisible penalty)
• Art. 63 rule: Applied regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua (cannot be reduced)
• ISL: Not applicable (indivisible penalty admits no gradation)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

On Articles 16-20

1. Three Degrees of Criminal Participation:

• Principals (Art. 17): Direct actors, inducers, indispensable cooperators
• Accomplices (Art. 18): Cooperate by previous/simultaneous acts but not indispensably
• Accessories (Art. 19): Post-facto participation in three specified ways

2. Penalty Gradation:

• Accomplices: -1 degree from principal (Art. 52)
• Accessories: -2 degrees from principal (Art. 53)
• Frustrated: -1 degree from consummated (Art. 50)
• Attempted: -2 degrees from consummated (Art. 51)

3. Conspiracy Effect:

• All conspirators are principals by direct participation
• Act of one = act of all
• Same penalty for all conspirators

4. Indispensability Test:

• Principal by indispensable cooperation: Without him, crime would NOT be accomplished
• Accomplice: Aids execution but crime could be accomplished without him

5. Accessory Exemptions (Art. 20):

• Covered: Spouses, ascendants, descendants, siblings (legitimate/natural/adopted), affinity within same degrees
• Exception: Not exempt for profiting from crime (Art. 19, par. 1)

6. R.A. 9346 Impact:

• Removed death from Article 71 graduated scale
• All penalties computed from death must be recalculated
• Maintains proper gradations for accomplices and accessories

7. Indivisible Penalties (Art. 63):

• Applied regardless of mitigating/aggravating circumstances
• Cannot be reduced by periods
• ISL not applicable

8. Qualifying Circumstances:

• Must be alleged specifically in Information
• Must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
• Affect penalty for principals—and consequently for accomplices/accessories

CROSS-REFERENCING: ARTICLES 16-20 WITH OTHER RPC PROVISIONS

A. CORRELATION WITH ARTICLES 46, 50-57, AND 60

THE FOUNDATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

Article 46 establishes the baseline principle:

"Penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed in all its periods on the principals in a consummated felony."

This means:

• Every penalty in the RPC is understood as prescribed for principals who commit consummated felonies
• All other penalties are computed by reference to this baseline
• Articles 50-57 provide the adjustment rules

PENALTY REDUCTION MATRIX (Arts. 50-57)

From your project knowledge, here's the complete penalty adjustment framework:

Key Articles Explained:

Article 50: "The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in a frustrated felony."

Article 51: "A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony."

Article 52: "The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony."

Article 53: "The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony."

Articles 54-57: Specify penalty computation for accomplices and accessories in frustrated and attempted felonies.

ARTICLE 60: THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE

Article 60 states:

"This provision shall not be applicable in cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories."

What This Means:

• Articles 50-57 are the default/general rules
• BUT specific Code provisions can override them
• When a specific article prescribes a special penalty, that controls

PRACTICAL APPLICATION FLOWCHART

STEP 1: Determine degree of participation (Arts. 16-20)
  → Principal (Art. 17)
  → Accomplice (Art. 18)
  → Accessory (Art. 19)

STEP 2: Determine stage of execution (Art. 6)
  → Consummated
  → Frustrated
  → Attempted

STEP 3: Check for special provisions (Art. 60)
  → Does specific article prescribe special penalty?
  → YES → Use special penalty (go to special articles below)
  → NO → Apply general rules (Arts. 46, 50-57)

STEP 4: Apply graduated scale (Art. 71)
  → Use penalty matrix to compute degrees

STEP 5: Apply modifying circumstances (Arts. 62-64)
  → Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
  → Determine proper period

B. CORRELATION WITH SPECIAL ARTICLES (297, 346, 268, 142, 162, 168, 173, 250)

These special articles demonstrate exceptions to the general participation rules of Articles 16-20. They show situations where:

1. Accomplices are punished as principals
2. Accessories are punished as principals
3. Accessories receive lighter reductions than normal
4. Special composite penalties apply
5. Extra reductions apply for policy reasons

ARTICLE 346: ACCOMPLICES AS PRINCIPALS (Abortion)

Codal Provision: "The accomplice in the commission of the crime of abortion shall be punished as principals."

Normal Rule (Arts. 18 + 52):

• Accomplice receives penalty 1 degree lower than principal

Special Rule (Art. 346):

• Accomplice receives SAME penalty as principal
• This is an upgrade in criminal liability

Rationale: The law considers abortion so grave that even non-indispensable cooperation warrants principal-level punishment. The policy is to deter all forms of participation in terminating pregnancy.

Example:

• Principal: Doctor who performs abortion = Prision mayor
• Accomplice (Normal): Nurse who assists but not indispensably = Prision correccional (1 degree lower)
• Accomplice (Art. 346): Nurse receives Prision mayor (same as principal)

Cross-Reference:

• Related to Art. 256-259 (Abortion provisions)
• Shows exception to Art. 52 penalty reduction rule

ARTICLE 268: ACCESSORIES AS PRINCIPALS (Serious Physical Injuries)

Codal Provision: "Any person who, knowing of the commission of any of the crimes covered by Articles 263 to 267, inclusive, should act as an accessory in any of the ways specified in Article 19, shall be liable to the same penalties prescribed for the principals."

Normal Rule (Arts. 19 + 53):

• Accessory receives penalty 2 degrees lower than principal

Special Rule (Art. 268):

• Accessory receives SAME penalty as principal
• This is an extreme upgrade in criminal liability

Rationale: Serious physical injuries cause grave harm. The law seeks to deter post-facto assistance that helps perpetrators evade justice or profit from violent crimes against persons.

Covered Physical Injuries (Arts. 263-267):

• Art. 263: Serious physical injuries
• Art. 264: Administering injurious substances
• Art. 265: Less serious physical injuries
• Art. 266: Slight physical injuries
• Art. 267: Mutilation

Example:

• Principal: Assailant who causes loss of limb = Prision mayor
• Accessory (Normal): Brother who hides assailant (Art. 19, par. 3) = Prision correccional (2 degrees lower)
• Accessory (Art. 268): Brother receives Prision mayor (same as principal)

Important Limitation: Article 20 exemption still applies - relatives specified in Art. 20 remain exempt even under Art. 268 (except for profiting from effects).

ARTICLE 142: ACCESSORIES AS PRINCIPALS (Rebellion/Coup d'État)

Codal Provision: "The persons liable as principals in the case of conspiracy, and the accessory shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding article."

Normal Rule (Arts. 19 + 53):

• Accessory receives penalty 2 degrees lower than principal

Special Rule (Art. 142):

• Accessory receives penalty prescribed for principal in rebellion/coup
• Recognizes gravity of crimes against national security

Rationale: Rebellion and coup d'état threaten the very existence of the state. Post-facto assistance (harboring rebels, concealing evidence, profiting from seized government property) is treated with utmost severity to preserve public order.

Penalty Reference (Art. 134-135):

• Rebellion: Prision mayor + fine
• Coup d'état: Prision mayor in maximum period + fine

Example:

• Principal: Military officer leading coup = Prision mayor maximum + fine
• Accessory (Normal): Civilian who hides coup leader = Prision correccional (2 degrees lower)
• Accessory (Art. 142): Civilian receives Prision mayor maximum + fine (same as principal)

Policy Consideration: This harsh treatment of accessories reflects the Code's priority on protecting national sovereignty and constitutional order.

ARTICLES 162, 168, 173: LIGHTER REDUCTION FOR ACCESSORIES (Forgery/Falsification)

Codal Provisions:

Art. 162 (Using Forged Signature/Seal): "The accessory shall suffer a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed for the principal."

Art. 168 (Illegal Possession of False Documents): "Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles."

Art. 173 (Using Falsified Wireless/Telegraph Messages): "Any person who shall use such falsified dispatches, knowing the same to be false, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided for in this article."

Normal Rule (Arts. 19 + 53):

• Accessory receives penalty 2 degrees lower than principal

Special Rule (Arts. 162, 168, 173):

• Accessory receives penalty ONLY 1 degree lower than principal
• Less severe reduction than normal

Rationale: Forgery and falsification crimes harm public confidence in documents and official acts. The law recognizes that using or possessing forged documents (typical accessory behavior) is nearly as harmful as creating them, because it perpetuates the fraud and undermines document integrity.

Example (Art. 168 - Illegal Possession):

• Principal: Forger who creates fake driver's license = Prision correccional (Art. 172)
• Accessory (Normal under Art. 53): Person who uses fake license = Arresto mayor (2 degrees lower)
• Accessory (Art. 168): Person receives Arresto mayor to Prision correccional minimum (1 degree lower)

Practical Impact: This reduced reduction means accessories to forgery/falsification receive harsher penalties than accessories to other crimes, recognizing the continuing harm caused by circulating false documents.

ARTICLE 297: SPECIAL PENALTY (Robbery with Homicide)

Codal Provision: "When by reason or on occasion of the robbery the crime of homicide shall have been committed, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code."

Normal Rule (Arts. 294 + 50-57):

• Robbery (Art. 294): Various penalties depending on circumstances
• Homicide (Art. 249): Reclusion temporal
• Apply participation reductions per Arts. 52-53

Special Rule (Art. 297):

• Complex crime with special composite penalty
• Harsher than either constituent crime alone
• All participants subject to this special penalty regime

Penalty Structure:

• Base: Reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua
• Minimum: 17 years, 4 months, 1 day
• Maximum: Reclusion perpetua (30 years or life)

Application to Participation:

Key Doctrine: Article 297 creates a special complex crime where the homicide is committed "by reason or on occasion of" robbery. This treats the composite crime more severely than simple robbery + homicide separately.

Rationale: Robbery with violence resulting in death is particularly heinous because:

1. Combines crimes against property and persons
2. Shows extreme disregard for human life
3. Often involves planning and deliberation
4. Creates exceptional public alarm

Example:

• Four robbers enter a house
• Principal A shoots and kills homeowner
• Principal B (lookout) did not shoot but part of conspiracy
• Accomplice C drove getaway car (not indispensable)
• Accessory D (brother) hid Principal A after crime

Penalties:

• Principals A & B: Reclusion temporal max to RP (Art. 297 directly)
• Accomplice C: Reclusion temporal min to max (1 degree lower per Art. 52)
• Accessory D: Prision mayor (2 degrees lower per Art. 53)

Contrast with Normal Rules: If robbery and homicide prosecuted separately without Art. 297:

• Robbery alone: Lower penalty
• Homicide alone: Reclusion temporal
• Combined effect less severe than Art. 297's special penalty

ARTICLE 250: EXTRA REDUCTION (Parricide/Murder/Homicide)

Codal Provision: "The penalty for parricide, murder or infanticide shall be imposed, in its entirety, in cases where the crime is frustrated; and the penalty next lower in degree, in cases where the crime is attempted."

Normal Rule (Arts. 50-51):

• Frustrated: -1 degree from consummated
• Attempted: -2 degrees from consummated

Special Rule (Art. 250):

• Frustrated: NO reduction (imposed "in its entirety")
• Attempted: -2 degrees (next lower degree) — appears same but see below

BUT WAIT - The Real Impact:

Art. 250 interacts with the normal reduction rules to create extra leniency for attempted crimes:

For Frustrated Crimes:

• Art. 50 says: -1 degree
• Art. 250 says: "in its entirety" (no reduction)
• Net effect: Frustrated gets HARSHER treatment (no reduction instead of -1)

For Attempted Crimes: When combined with participation reductions:

• Art. 51 alone: -2 degrees
• But Art. 250's "in its entirety" for frustrated means the base is higher
• Then attempted goes -2 from that higher base
• Net effect: -3 degrees total instead of just -2

Campanilla's Commentary: "Because of the already very grave penalties for parricide, murder, and infanticide, the law provides additional leniency in attempted stage. This prevents disproportionate punishment where the crime was never close to completion."

Example (Murder):

Consummated Murder (Art. 248):

• Principal: Reclusion perpetua (post-R.A. 9346)

Frustrated Murder (Art. 250 + Art. 50):

• Normal rule (Art. 50): Reclusion temporal (-1 degree)
• Art. 250: "In its entirety" = Reclusion perpetua (NO reduction)
• Result: Frustrated murder gets SAME penalty as consummated

Attempted Murder (Art. 250 + Art. 51):

• From frustrated base (RP) = -1 degree
• Art. 51 reduction = -2 degrees
• Total reduction: -3 degrees from consummated
• Result: Prision mayor (not prision correccional)

Participation Application:

Policy Rationale: The law recognizes that:

1. Parricide, murder, and infanticide carry extremely severe base penalties
2. Frustrated stage already close to completion (all acts done, just didn't die)
3. Attempted stage far from completion (commenced but not all acts)
4. Extra leniency for attempted prevents excessive punishment
5. Frustrated receives harsh treatment to deter near-completion violence

Reyes' Commentary: "Article 250 is a special provision that modifies the general rules of Articles 50-51 specifically for the gravest crimes against persons. It shows legislative policy balancing severity of punishment with proportionality to actual harm."

C. THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

DECISION TREE FOR PENALTY DETERMINATION

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STEP 1: DETERMINE CRIMINAL PARTICIPATION (Arts. 16-20)  │
│                                                         │
│  → Principal (Art. 17)                                  │
│  → Accomplice (Art. 18)                                 │
│  → Accessory (Art. 19)                                  │
│  → Check Art. 20 exemptions                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STEP 2: DETERMINE STAGE OF EXECUTION (Art. 6)           │
│                                                         │
│  → Consummated (all elements present)                   │
│  → Frustrated (all acts done, not produced)             │
│  → Attempted (commenced, not all acts)                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STEP 3: CHECK FOR SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Art. 60)          │
│                                                         │
│  Does crime have special penalty provision?             │
│                                                         │
│  → Art. 346 (Abortion - accomplice as principal)        │
│  → Arts. 268, 142 (Accessory as principal)              │
│  → Arts. 162, 168, 173 (1 degree reduction only)        │
│  → Art. 297 (Robbery w/ Homicide composite)             │
│  → Art. 250 (Parricide/Murder special rules)            │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
          ↓                                    ↓
    YES - USE                            NO - USE
    SPECIAL                              GENERAL RULES
    PROVISION                            (Arts. 46, 50-57)
          ↓                                    ↓
          └────────────────┬──────────────────┘
                           ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STEP 4: APPLY GRADUATED SCALE (Art. 71)                 │
│                                                         │
│  Compute penalty degrees using Article 71 scale:        │
│  1. Reclusion perpetua                                  │
│  2. Reclusion temporal                                  │
│  3. Prision mayor                                       │
│  4. Prision correccional                                │
│  5. Arresto mayor, etc.                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STEP 5: APPLY MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (Arts. 62-64)     │
│                                                         │
│  → Aggravating circumstances (Art. 14)                  │
│  → Mitigating circumstances (Art. 13)                   │
│  → Alternative circumstances (Art. 15)                  │
│  → Determine proper period (min/med/max)                │
│  → Apply Indeterminate Sentence Law if applicable       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            ↓
                    FINAL PENALTY

SUMMARY TABLE OF EXCEPTIONS

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Chapter 2 (Arts. 16-20) = The Foundation

• Establishes WHO is liable (principal/accomplice/accessory)
• Defines HOW they participated
• Provides baseline framework

2. Arts. 46, 50-57, 60 = The General Penalty Rules

• Art. 46: All penalties prescribed for principals in consummated felonies
• Arts. 50-51: Stage reductions (frustrated, attempted)
• Arts. 52-53: Participation reductions (accomplice, accessory)
• Art. 60: Exception clause allowing special provisions

3. Special Articles = The Overrides

• Override general rules in specific situations
• Can upgrade (accomplice → principal)
• Can modify reductions (2 degrees → 1 degree)
• Can prescribe composite penalties
• Reflect specific policy considerations

4. Always Check the Codal First

• Special provisions control over general rules
• Amendments may not be in older textbooks
• Updated RPC reflects current law

5. Pro Reo Application

• When in doubt, apply rule favorable to accused
• Strict construction against state
• Liberal interpretation for accused

CONCLUSION

Articles 16-20 of the Revised Penal Code establish the fundamental framework for determining who is criminally liable and to what degree. These provisions recognize that:

1. Criminal participation varies in degree from direct execution to post-facto assistance
2. Penalties must be proportionate to the degree of participation
3. Family bonds warrant exemption from accessory liability (except profiting)
4. Proper penalty computation requires understanding the graduated scale and its application

The abolition of the death penalty by R.A. 9346 demonstrates that these provisions remain dynamic and subject to legislative modification, requiring practitioners to stay current with amendments affecting penalty computation.

Mastery of Articles 16-20 is essential for:

• Proper charging in criminal informations
• Accurate penalty determination
• Understanding collective vs. individual criminal responsibility
• Applying exemptions and mitigating/aggravating circumstances
• Computing penalties for different degrees of participation

END OF COMPREHENSIVE LEARNING MATERIAL

Next Steps:

1. Review penalty computation tables
2. Analyze additional case law
3. Practice problems on degree of participation
4. Study interaction with Articles 48 (complex crimes), 50-57 (penalty graduation), 61-72 (penalty application)